



Reflecting on the Language of Death 
Deborah S. Gordon† 
it will be short, it will take all your breath 
it will not be simple, it will become your will1 
The “Last Words” of great men, Napoleon, Lord Byron, 
were . . . printed in gift books, and the dying murmurs of every 
common man and woman were listened for and treasured by their 
neighbours and kinfolk.  These sayings, no matter how unimportant, 
were given oracular significance and pondered by those who must 
one day go the same road.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: A seventy-five-year-old woman 
visits her estate planning lawyer to execute her will.  The instrument she 
is given to sign directs the woman’s executor to distribute the woman’s 
primary asset, a small farm, to her eldest daughter and to make token 
financial gifts to her other two children.3  The balance of the will con-
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 1. Adrienne Rich, Final Notations, in THE ART OF LOSING: POEMS OF GRIEF & HEALING 34 
(Kevin Young ed., 2010) [hereinafter THE ART OF LOSING]. 
 2. WILLA CATHER, DEATH COMES FOR THE ARCHBISHOP 172–73 (Alfred A. Kopf 1964) 
(1927). 
 3. The specific dispositive provisions might read as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), I direct my executor to make the following 
distributions: 
a. TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000) to my son B; 
b. TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000) to my youngest daughter C; 
c. My farm, together with all the fixtures, furniture, and equipment located 
thereon (hereafter “the Farm”), to my eldest daughter, A; 
d. All the rest and remainder of any property I own, to be sold and the net 
proceeds of sale to A. 
(2) If A, in her sole and absolute discretion, decides to sell the Farm within one (1) year 
of my date of death, I direct my Executor to distribute the net proceeds of sale, together 
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tains detailed administrative provisions, including a standard forfeiture 
clause that bars anyone who challenges the will from taking under it.4  In 
accordance with her lawyer’s advice, and because the instrument seems 
situated to achieve the woman’s donative intent, she executes it.  She 
leaves her lawyer’s office with a technically proficient will poised to 
cause divisiveness among her surviving family members. 
There is, of course, more to this story.  The woman has explained to 
her lawyer that she and her late husband purchased the farm when they 
married, and that together they cultivated it into a small but profitable 
business that helped finance the educations of their children.  The wom-
an’s eldest daughter, who lives nearby, helps run the farm.  The woman’s 
son moved to a nearby city, where he manages a commercial real estate 
company, and her youngest daughter lives out of state, where she prac-
tices medicine.  The woman concedes that the farm is more valuable for 
its real estate than as an operating business, but her primary goal is to 
preserve the legacy that she and her husband built together.  Although 
she loves her children equally, the woman has expressed to her lawyer 
her belief that she will achieve her goal by leaving the farm outright to 
her eldest daughter.5  The lawyer has cautioned against incorporating any 
of this explanation into the will itself.  Opining that the document serves 
its purpose by transmitting the woman’s property as she intends, the law-
yer advises that any more expressive, descriptive, or unusual language, 
any recounting of this alternative story, is unnecessary and may provide 
grounds for a challenge by one of the disadvantaged beneficiaries.  The 
woman ends up executing a will that reflects her specific wishes but does 
nothing to put them in their fundamental context. 
Often the final significant written communication by its author, a 
will has the potential to be a monument—or indeed a testament—to the 
decedent’s loved ones, to express her vision for the future or her version 
                                                                                                                                     
with any property described in subsection (1) above, equally among my three children A, 
B, and C. 
 4. Also called an “in terrorem” or “no-contest” clause, a forfeiture clause is a standard provi-
sion stating that anyone who challenges a will may not inherit under it.  See Martin D. Begleiter, 
Anti-Contest Clauses: When You Care Enough to Send the Final Threat, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629, 629 
(1994); Gerry W. Beyer, Rob G. Dickinson & Kenneth L. Wake, The Fine Art of Intimidating Dis-
gruntled Beneficiaries with In Terrorem Clauses, 51 SMU L. REV. 225, 227 (1998) (defining an in 
terrorem clause as “a provision that voids gifts to beneficiaries who fail in their attempt to invalidate 
the instrument and seek to enlarge their shares by taking as heirs under the applicable intestacy sta-
tutes or under a prior dispositive instrument”). 
 5. The hypothetical provisions set forth in note 3 supra are designed to reflect the realistic 
situation of a testator who does not wish to tie her daughter up in complicated trust provisions or 
impose any requirements or conditions on ownership, other than dividing the property equally if the 
daughter decides, in her sole discretion and within a reasonable time, to choose not to continue the 
business after her mother’s death. 
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of the past.  More often than not, however, today’s wills are written in an 
insider’s private language, so that testator after testator exclaims about 
the formal, dry, legalistic, and sometimes archaic writing at the will-
execution ceremony.6  If all written communication has meaning7 and if 
all legal writing has enhanced meaning because it also has a real-world 
effect,8 then imagine the potential of legal writing that embodies an indi-
vidual’s “last words.”  A will can reflect and reinforce the decedent’s 
relationships with friends and family, can express support for institutions 
and causes in which the decedent believes, and can establish the dece-
dent’s lasting legacy.9  And even if the will is simple and mundane, its 
terminal nature imbues the will with talismanic power. 
This Article argues that a more expressive and expansive approach 
to will drafting—one which incorporates important components of the 
testator’s life story—has value not only as a means of incorporating the 
testator’s voice, but also as a means of addressing the problems of inter-
preting dry, technical language.  The term “expressive language” for the 
purposes of this Article refers to writing that departs from formula and 
enhances the nonlinguistic function of the document provisions.10  While 
                                                            
 6. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 69–71. 
 8. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 382 
(1941) (“Words are the principal tools of lawyers and judges, whether we like it or not. They are to 
us what the scalpel and insulin are to the doctor, or a theodolite and sliderule to the civil engineer.”); 
cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 7 (2d ed. 1998) 
(“Law is a system of social control as well as a body of texts, and its operation is illuminated by the 
social sciences and judged by ethical criteria. Literature is an art, and the best methods for interpret-
ing and evaluating it are aesthetic.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1057, 1062 (1996) [hereinafter Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency] (“[B]ecause lay persons 
more frequently use words for communicative than for performative purposes, it falls upon authori-
ties carefully to differentiate those instances in which persons intend their words to carry legal con-
sequences from those in which they do not.”). 
 9. Constance D. Smith, New and Improved Testaments for Estate Planning Documents, 32 
COLO. LAW. 73, 73 (Dec. 2003) (“It is worth evaluating whether estate planning documents articu-
late what the client would want said to his or her grieving family and friends, and whether the legal 
documents are likely to soothe or aggravate the survivors’ pain.”); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts 
and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 595 (2005) (“[W]e care about what happens to our 
property after death . . . [because of] the passions that we feel in life: love for family and friends; 
love for the arts; love for education; love for bettering humanity.  We want the people we care about 
to have the money they need after we are gone, and we want the causes or institutions about which 
we are passionate to continue in existence.  But these are not the only reasons.  We often fear that 
our property will be put to a use of which we do not approve, or that it will be wasted, and we want 
to ensure that does not happen.  And, in many cases, we may want to dispose of our property so as to 
leave a mark on this world, so that those who come afterward will look back on our life and accom-
plishments and respect us and the values for which we stood.”). 
 10. A will, like any binding legal document, has nonlinguistic functions: for example, it distri-
butes property, appoints fiduciaries, and confers powers.  See Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 
supra note 8, at 1062–63 (describing performative and communicative power of words in wills).  
This Article argues that these nonlinguistic functions are enhanced by including language that ex-
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I recognize that an extensive literature discussing the “expressive” func-
tion of the law exists, I do not intend to invoke that literature in this Ar-
ticle because it is concerned with entirely different goals.11 
A study of how wills are written, and specifically whether a place 
exists for expressive language and personal narrative in testamentary 
documents, is long overdue.  Although the force of narrative in the law 
has been widely recognized, only a few scholars in recent years have ex-
plored its place in transactional, and specifically testamentary, docu-
ments.12  In addition, this Article’s approach to the law of wills fills a 
vacuum in the current substantive wills scholarship, which focuses al-
most exclusively on will interpretation rather than will creation. 
As Part II explains, nearly every discussion of wills law begins with 
the familiar maxim that a testator’s donative intent is the “polestar” that 
guides interpretation of testamentary documents.13  Despite this basic 
                                                                                                                                     
plains, broadens, deepens, or refines the nonlinguistic functions.  See generally Matthew D. Adler, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1385–88 (2000) (de-
scribing distinction between nonlinguistic and linguistic meaning and between speaker’s linguistic 
meaning and sentence linguistic meaning); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive 
Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1506–07 (2000) (expressive 
language manifests writer’s state of mind, in all of its multiple dimensions).  Accordingly, in this 
Article, it is not simply the action directed by the will and its results that matter, but also the justifi-
cations and reasons behind the results that allow the speaker and readers to appreciate why the action 
has occurred.  But cf. Andersen & Pildes, supra, at 1510–12. 
 11. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 10, at 1364–74 (describing leading “expressivity” scholarship 
and doctrine); E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-
Marital Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1077–80 (1999) (describing expressive function of intes-
tacy law); Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories 
Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 294–95 (2010) (same). 
 12. See infra note 29. 
 13. This principle is reflected in legal scholarship, judicial decisions, treatises, and casebooks.  
For selected examples from the scholarship, see, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and 
Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 634 (1992) [hereinafter Baron, Stories] (casebooks, statutes, and cases 
“‘in the field [of wills] have as their purpose the discovery of the true intent of the property owner, 
not to thwart it, but to give it effect[]’”) (quoting ELIAS CLARK ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 1 (3d ed. 1985)); Begleiter, supra note 4, at 633 (“The testator’s intent has 
been referred to as the ‘polestar’ of testamentary construction.”); Michael Hancher, Dead Letters: 
Wills and Poems, 60 TEX. L. REV. 507, 514 (1982) (arguing that, in wills, we should search tho-
roughly for the intention of the testator); John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules] (“The dominant 
substantive principle of the law of gratuitous transfers is to carry out the donor’s intent.”); and John 
H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1975) [herei-
nafter Langbein, Compliance] (“[V]irtually the entire law of wills derives from the premise that an 
owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in life.”).  For judicial decisions 
espousing this principle, see, e.g., In re Kerr’s Estate, 433 F.2d 479, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Barnett v. 
Estate of Anderson, 966 So. 2d 915, 919 (Ala. 2007); Phillips v. Estate of Holzmann, 740 So. 2d 1, 2 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998), review denied, 735 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1999); Strojek ex rel. Mills v. Har-
din Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999); and Estate of Smertz, 701 
A.2d 268, 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  For examples of treatises and text books stating the idea, see, 
e.g., 96 C.J.S. WILLS § 831 (2009) (“The chief object and purpose of the construction of a will is to 
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agreement, scholars have opined at length about the difficulty—even 
impossibility—of divining authorial intent from written language gener-
ally14 and from wills in particular.15  The existing scholarship ultimately 
fails to improve wills law because it addresses only the reading of wills, 
relegating writing considerations to the practicing bar.16 
Part III explores the benefits and costs of incorporating expressive 
language into wills.17  This Part argues that including explanations, de-
                                                                                                                                     
discover and carry out the intent of the testator as expressed in the will, and this is the prime duty of 
the court, and its sole function or province.  In other words, the intention of the testator is the prime 
or paramount consideration, controlling factor or element, main guide in the interpretation of a will, 
or polestar to guide the court to which the problem is presented in the construction of every will.”) 
(citations and footnotes omitted) and LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1–6 (4th ed. 2006) [hereinafter 
WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW]. 
 14. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 43 (1980) (“The objectivity of 
the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous illusion, because it is so physically convincing.  
The illusion is one of self-sufficiency and completeness.  A line of print or a page is so obviously 
there . . . that it seems to be the sole repository of whatever value and meaning we associate with 
it.”); Stanley Fish, There Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 632–33 (2005) [he-
reinafter Fish, No Textualist Position] (“The instant I try to construe the words, the instant that I hear 
the sounds as words, the instant I treat them as language, I will have put in place some purpose . . . in 
the light of which those sounds become words and acquire sense.  Words alone, without an animat-
ing intention, do not have power, do not have semantic shape, and are not yet language; and when 
someone tells you (as a textualist always will) that he or she is able to construe words apart from 
intention and then proceeds (triumphantly) to do it, what he or she will really have done is assumed 
an intention without being aware of having done so.”); Chafee, supra note 8, at 388–89 (“We find 
abundant examples in law of the trouble caused by a word which is capable of standing for two or 
more different objects,” leading Justice Holmes to remark that “‘A word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according 
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.’”) (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 
425 (1918)); Sanford Levinson, Law As Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 380–82, 402–03 (1982) 
(comparing textualists to “truthseekers” but ultimately recognizing that “[e]ven poets who emphas-
ize the contingency of perception nevertheless continue to write their poems” because all “writing 
(and reading) is a supreme act of faith”). 
 15. See, e.g., Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 633 (“[T]he connection between the words of 
testamentary instruments and the intention that is supposed to animate them can be extremely prob-
lematic.  The problem is clearly larger than wills law in particular.  It implicates generally recog-
nized concerns about the nature of and relations between thought and language.”); Chafee, supra 
note 8, at 394–97 (noting and discussing linguistic ambiguities in cases involving donative instru-
ments); Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 631–35 (1988) 
(describing how language’s imperfections and imprecision prove particularly problematic when 
attempting to read a will to divine donative intent); Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Inter-
pretation: Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 549–54 (2005) (exploring different 
interpretative approaches to analysis of wills and contracts).  But see Hancher, supra note 13, at 
522–23 (1982) (“[R]eading statutes or constitutions is harder than reading a will [because] the pas-
sage of time can enlarge the hermeneutic gap that always exists between interpretation and applica-
tion . . . .  [I]n time the same section of a statute or constitution may need to be applied again, and yet 
again, to novel circumstances extremely remote from the circumstances that framed the Framers’ 
supposed intentions.  The ordinary will does not invite such difficult rereading.”). 
 16. See infra text and accompanying note 62. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 65–156. 
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scriptions, and purpose provisions in a will provides a testator with the 
opportunity to express her individualism and thereby create a testament 
to her beneficiaries, even if such language is not necessary to the will’s 
dispositive or nonlinguistic functions. 
Then, Part IV tests the concern that testators and their beneficiaries 
would suffer a legal disadvantage from a more expressive approach to 
wills language by surveying cases in which wills are challenged on the 
grounds of undue influence.  These cases from the past five years pro-
vide examples of how language is currently used in wills and how courts 
respond to that language.  Contrary to expectations, the case law supports 
the idea that directly infusing wills with individualized, expressive, and 
what some might call “extra” language better insulates them against chal-
lenges.18 
Based on this foundation of theory, analysis, and case studies, 
Part V concludes that deliberate focus on a will’s language to enhance 
the accepted and well-tested “linguistic formulae”19 can help people 
make more mindful choices about their legacies and change how those 
legacies are conveyed to and understood by a will’s many readers.  Far 
from a luxury, encouraging a testator to express herself in her will can 
strengthen the testator’s connection to her personal identity and her 
community, an important step in furthering the ultimate goal of having 
her property pass as she intends and desires. 
II.  HOW THE LONG-STANDING SCHOLARLY DEBATE ABOUT 
INTERPRETATION OMITS A CRUCIAL INQUIRY 
In the bundle of property rights encountered by every first-year law 
student is the power to convey one’s property at death, also known as the 
freedom of disposition.20  If this power is not exercised, a person dies 
intestate (or without a will), and default rules dictate how and to whom 
her property passes.21  Properly exercised, this power allows a decedent 
                                                            
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 157–230. 
 19. See Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 8, at 1062. 
 20. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 165 (6th ed. 2006); Joan Williams, The 
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 283 (1998); see also David Horton, Unconscionability 
in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1682, 1700 & n.33 (“[T]he power to designate 
who will receive one’s assets at death adds an important stick to the bundle of property rights.”); 
Langbein, Compliance, supra note 13, at 491 (“The first principle of the law of wills is freedom of 
testation.”). 
 21. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE Art. 2, pt. I (“Intestate Succession”); JESSE DUKEMINIER, 
ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 71–73 (8th ed. 2009) [he-
reinafter DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS]; EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
DECEDENTS’ ESTATES AND TRUSTS 27 (7th ed. 2006); WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, 
supra note 13, at 2–5; Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of Its 
Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1033–37 (2004); Frances Foster, The Family Paradigm of 
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to die content that her loved ones, the “natural objects of her bounty,”22 
will receive her treasures and thereby benefit from her generosity and 
care either at the moment of her death or, if a trust is in place, over 
time.23 
How best to interpret and understand the testator’s intent as it is 
conveyed in her will has been the subject of a long-standing debate,24 one 
unlikely to end soon.25  One reason for the interest in will interpretation 
                                                                                                                                     
Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 206 (2001) [hereinafter Foster, Family Paradigm]; see also 
Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of Wills and Demographic Status, 23 
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 36 (2009) (presenting and analyzing survey data about people who die 
intestate). 
 22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(b) 
(2003) (to be competent to make a will, a testator, among other things, must know and understand in 
a general way the “natural objects of his or her bounty”). 
 23. See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1303, 1327 (2003); Fellows, supra note 15, at 626 (in addition to minimizing taxes, the prima-
ry criteria for a good estate plan is that it remains flexible for as long as possible); John H. Langbein, 
Mandatory Rules,  supra note 13, at 1110–11 (“The distinctive attribute of a trust is that it can and 
commonly does perpetuate the settlor’s autonomy after his or her death (hence the dead-hand la-
bel).”); Tate, supra note 9, at 606 (describing how trusts that last for some period of time after the 
creator’s death must be flexible enough to serve unplanned occurrences, such as changes in marital 
and family status, wealth, and well being of the trust’s beneficiaries, tax laws, trust doctrine, invest-
ment opportunities, and world financial situations).  A common estate plan consists not only of a will 
but also of other instruments, like stand-alone trusts, pension plans, joint tenancies, payable on death 
accounts, among others, that dispose of property outside of the probate system.  See generally John 
H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1108 (1984).  This Article focuses deliberately on language in wills, “the most important and 
the most sensitive part of the enterprise.”  THOMAS L. SHAFFER, CAROL ANN MOONEY & AMY JO 
BOETTCHER, THE PLANNING AND DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 177 (5th ed., Found. Press 
2007) [hereinafter SHAFFER ET AL., DRAFTING WILLS].  Stand-alone trust agreements present fasci-
nating drafting questions, and many of the same observations about drafting apply equally.  See 
Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 592–93 (2008) (describing results of 
poorly drafted living trust) [hereinafter Foster, Trust Privacy]; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of 
Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1452–56 (1961) (discussing problems 
raised by discretionary trusts, which “too frequently . . . provide no guidance as to the purpose and 
scope of [the trustee’s] power,” and suggesting drafting solutions); see also infra note 31. 
 24. See Chafee, supra note 8, at 394 & n.15.  Participants in this debate include scholars, prac-
titioners, courts, legislatures, and even law school classes.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102 
(2010) (“Purposes; Rule of Construction . . . (b) The underlying purposes and policies of this Code 
are: . . . (2) to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property.”); 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2010) (“Reformation to Correct Mistakes.  The court may reform the 
terms of a governing instrument . . . to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention . . . .”); 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 335 (describing Chapter 5 as focusing on will inter-
pretation which is “easier said than done”); WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, supra note 
13, Ch. 12, at 12-1 (describing chapter as addressing the “dilemma of how the law should respond to 
allegations of mistake (and uncertainty about the meaning of language)”); Greenawalt, supra note 
15, at 549–50. 
 25. See Hancher, supra note 13, at 523–25 (“The strategic question of the author’s inten-
tion . . . usually defies consensus: one interpretive strategy will sanction elaborate efforts to recover 
the author’s subjective intention, but another will repudiate any interest in the matter . . . .  I predict 
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is that the author of a will is necessarily unavailable to describe the 
meaning of ambiguous or controversial sections when the text takes its 
effect.26  Another reason is that the individualized nature of testation 
means that precedent often is useless to guide understanding of a particu-
lar testator’s language or donative intent.27  A third reason for the interest 
is simply that death, with all of its human drama and details, is an area of 
the law with wide-scale impact.28 
This Part first briefly surveys some of the leading contributions to 
the debate about donative intent, then highlights how the discussions 
neglect to address the writing, as opposed to the reading, of wills.  Not-
withstanding a wealth of debate about interpretation, only a few scholars 
in recent years have considered whether testators should include more 
varied and expressive language, more personalized stories, in their 
wills.29  Legal scholarship, and the areas on which it chooses to focus, 
                                                                                                                                     
that literary critics as well as lawyers (who have debated this question much longer) will a hundred 
years from now still be pondering the importance of the author’s intention.”). 
 26. See, e.g., In re Clarke’s Estate, 57 P.2d 5, 8 (Colo. 1936) (“It is a familiar and well-settled 
principle of law that a will speaks as of the time of death or as though it had been written immediate-
ly prior to death.”); In re Estate of Heller, 159 N.W.2d 82, 85 (Wis. 1968) (“A will written and ex-
ecuted is merely the expression of an intention to dispose of one’s property in a certain way in the 
future, provided one does not have a change of mind.  Only when death ensues, thus making a 
change of mind impossible, will these expressions of future intention bring rights into existence.”); 
Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 550 (“When courts construe wills, their writers are not available to say 
what they were trying to do (or how their wishes may have changed by the time they died).”); Jeff-
rey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on 
Conjugal and Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1284 (1999) (describing how the author of 
a will, because she no longer is around to need the property, exercises “power without responsibili-
ty”). 
 27. See SHAFFER ET AL., DRAFTING WILLS, supra note 23, at 188 (“[The processes for inter-
preting language in wills] should avoid the rigidity of stare decisis because in this sort of case—as in 
no other—no two cases are alike.”); Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing 
Distinction Between Will Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 66–67 
(2005) (“Because of a growing distrust and dissatisfaction with the application of hidebound inter-
pretive rules to testamentary documents, the law of will interpretation has gradually evolved from a 
stiff and often artificial formalism to an almost organic approach to interpretation that extols the 
quest for the testator’s intention. . . .  [S]ome courts have gone as far as to announce that precedent is 
not controlling in will interpretation matters.  Without stare decisis as a guide, and without seman-
tics as an unassailable benchmarking tool, the quest to locate a testator’s intent through the words of 
her testament becomes particularly perplexing.”). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 159–62, 231–38; cf. KARL S. GUTHKE, LAST WORDS: 
VARIATIONS ON A THEME IN CULTURAL HISTORY 49 (1992) (“At first glance, it might be thought 
that what assures last words of attention always and everywhere is the banal fact that mortality is a 
sine qua non of the human condition.”) (emphasis added). 
 29. See Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and Testaments, 85 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2010) (investigating the power of voice and persona in testamentary 
drafting); see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 198 (recognizing some value in 
accompanying a testamentary document with explanatory language); SHAFFER ET AL., supra note 23, 
at 173–88 (describing language, both preferred and archaic, for drafting wills).  Some articles also 
discuss drafting in the context of specific legal issues, such as lapse.  See, e.g., John L. Garvey, 
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shape not only intellectual debate but also pedagogical and practical ap-
proaches to the law.  By assuming that competent lawyers draft valid 
wills, which in the “overwhelming majority” of instances will never be 
contested or questioned,30 and by failing to consider proposals for how 
wills might be written better or at least differently, the existing wills 
scholarship neglects an important tool for changing how lawyers, law 
students, courts, beneficiaries, and existing and future testators think 
about what makes a valid will. 
A.  Existing Scholars’ Proposals for Interpreting Wills 
The traditional tension in the debate over how to interpret wills has 
been polarized.31  According to the strict view, words in a will should be 
given their “plain meaning,” such that extrinsic evidence should not be 
                                                                                                                                     
Drafting Wills and Trusts: Anticipating the Birth and Death of Possible Beneficiaries, 71 OR. L. 
REV. 47, 47–48 (1992) (discussing lapse).  Noteworthy in its detailed approach to wills language, 
Professor Sneddon’s recent article is a scholarly examination of how important individual voice and 
persona are to wills.  I am grateful to her for sharing an early version of her article with me and seek, 
in this piece, to participate in the discussion Professor Sneddon has started by taking a focused look 
at a specific body of case law and its treatment of wills language. 
 30. Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 667–68 (“Sometimes stories will be unnecessary.  Most 
cases will not be contested.  However ‘remote’ the words of attorney-drafted instruments may be 
from the ordinary stories told by the testator in his own words, the ‘legal words’ can function tolera-
bly well to achieve dispositive objectives.  Indeed, this is the result for which so many responsible 
estate planners strive, and mostly succeed.”); James L. Robertson, Myth and Reality—Or is it “Per-
ception and Taste”?—In the Reading of Donative Documents, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1045, 1055 
(1993) (“Every lawyer familiar with the field knows the overwhelming majority of donative docu-
ments are adequately drafted so that no questions arise or, in any event, so that they may be enforced 
and implemented efficiently, without resort to litigation.”); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case 
for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 144 (2008) (“[A] skilled estate planner can 
always take steps to make a will contest less likely or less likely to succeed. For instance, planners 
may gather evidence of capacity before death, making sure that potential witnesses see that the testa-
tor is competent. They may also draft an effective no-contest clause in the will. Thus a good estate 
planner can make disinheritance of children or grandchildren effective, unless the testator obviously 
lacks testamentary capacity or competent volition.”). 
 31. Because the scholarship considering will interpretation is extensive, this Article examines 
only a representative sampling and does not purport to be exhaustive.  This Article also focuses 
deliberately on language in wills, see supra note 23, though the same debate about interpretation—
whether to seek and attempt to apply the property owner’s intent or to apply default rules and modify 
the trust provisions in service to other values—is equally alive in the trust literature.  See, e.g., Ben-
jamin H. Pruett, Tales from the Dark Side: Drafting Issues from the Fiduciary’s Perspective, 35 
ACTEC J. 331, 341–47 (2010) (“To the extent that the settlor’s intent is expressed in the trust, it is 
much easier for the trustee to carry out that intent.”); Tate, supra note 9, at 622–23 (examining com-
peting theories about trust termination and modification because “[w]hether the settlor’s intent 
should be respected is a central problem, perhaps the central problem, of the law of trusts”); cf. Ro-
bert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trusts Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 667–69 (2004) 
(discussing costs of settlor standing to sue trustee to enforce intent regarding treatment of beneficia-
ries). 
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available to aid interpretation other than in very limited circumstances;32 
the more liberal view recognizes that language is inherently imperfect, 
such that relying on words alone to discern meaning and understand a 
testator’s intent is impossible.33  Although commentators uniformly agree 
that courts, juries, and even beneficiaries cannot glean a testator’s intent 
apart from the manifestations of that intent—in other words, the testa-
tor’s language and actions34—their approaches to weighing and interpret-
ing those manifestations differ.  As James B. Thayer characterized the 
problem more than two centuries ago, the “fatal necessity of looking out-
side the text in order to identify persons and things, tends steadily to . . . 
reveal the essential imperfection of language.”35  Or, as a more poetic 
                                                            
 32. DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 335–36; see Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 
557 (“Courts have traditionally assumed that if the text of a will has a plain meaning, they should not 
go beyond the text; and more generally courts have refused to consider what testators said at the time 
about what they were trying to do or how they understood particular words they used in the will.”); 
Storrow, supra note 27, at 70 (“The plain-meaning rule states that where a testator’s intention is 
clear from the plain language of the document, there is no need to admit extrinsic evidence or resort 
to rules of construction to advance the interpretive process.”). 
 33. See, e.g., 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2462, at 198 (James H. Chad-
bourn ed., rev. 1981) (“The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real or 
absolute meaning. In truth there can be only some person’s meaning: and that person, whose mean-
ing the law is seeking, is the writer of the document. . . . [T]he ‘plain meaning’ is simply the mean-
ing of the people who did not write the document.”); Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 560–62 (describ-
ing debate and recognizing that “[l]eading scholars of the last century have not looked kindly on 
plain meaning rules, and leading modern scholars have supported a focus on the intent of a will’s 
author in preference to reliance on plain meaning”).  Wigmore, in addition to authoring the canonical 
text on evidence and serving the law in many other ways, created a “Legal List of Novels” that 
helped “revolutionize” the “law and literature movement” by encouraging lawyers to read great 
works of literature to enhance their legal professionalism.  See generally Richard H. Weisberg, 
Wigmore and the Law and Literature Movement, 21 L. & LIT. 129 (2009) (describing Wigmore’s 
contributions and the lessons of his list for legal interpretation generally). 
 34. See, e.g., Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 641 (“[D]espite their apparently vehement disa-
greement over interpretative issues, the commentators are surprisingly uniform in their insistence 
that interpretation must focus on the words.”); Fellows, supra note 15, at 626 (cautioning against 
imputing a more “generalized” intent when manifestations of the testator’s specific intent (language 
and actions) are inadequate to determine testator’s desire with respect to distributions). 
 35. See JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 429 (1898); see also 
Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 648 (“[T]he problems of will interpretation illustrate and exemplify 
a more general problem concerning the interrelation of thought and language.”); Fellows, supra note 
15, at 631–32 (“Words are imperfect means of communication because a word can stand for more 
than one object or event . . . .  [T]he word’s relation to the object is an indirect means of conveying 
the property owner’s thought and, therefore, is susceptible to miscues.”); Hancher, supra note 13, at 
513–14 (“In so varied and variable a linguistic world, even the most skillful writer must be at a dis-
advantage; and many ordinary writers of wills are not skillful at all.  Ethical compassion for their 
plight moved [one scholar] to proclaim interpretation to be ‘in truth a species of equity,’ with the 
judge acting as champion of the testator’s subjective intention, rather than as the jealous guardian of 
legal niceties.”) (citations omitted); Storrow, supra note 27, at 71 (“The plain-meaning rule has been 
the subject of considerable derision, with no less an authority than Professor Wigmore branding it a 
fallacy: ‘In truth there can be only some person’s meaning: and that person, whose meaning the law 
2011] Reflecting on the Language of Death 389 
scholar has explained, “[i]n the interpretation of wills some cases do 
seem to show the difference between the letter, which killeth, and the 
spirit, which giveth life.”36 
This “fatal” and “essential imperfection” of language has led critics 
of the “plain meaning” rule to posit numerous alternative interpretative 
mechanisms to deduce the testator’s intent from her will or, in the ab-
sence of being able to do so, to prefer rules that support certain societal 
preferences and norms.37  For example, an early but noteworthy critic of 
the “plain meaning” rule was Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who ad-
vised that instead of seeking subjective meaning in the language of a 
will, courts should ask what the language means “in the mouth of a nor-
mal speaker of English[.]”38  By considering how “our old friend the 
prudent [person]” would have used words in similar circumstances, 
Holmes observed, courts can discern and decode ambiguous language.39  
Professor (formerly state supreme court Justice) James L. Robertson ad-
vocates a modern version of Holmes’s objective approach to will inter-
pretation, what he terms a “circumstanced external approach,”40 under 
which a reader deliberately refuses to “invad[e] the mind of the person 
who made the donative transfer” and instead refers to “the hypothetical, 
yet reasoned, intent of an external character, an imagined semi-sovereign 
donor.”41 
While agreeing that the divination of subjective intent is an elusive 
goal, other scholars have rejected the idea that an “objective” approach to 
interpretation is possible or even useful.  Instead, they have advocated 
that courts confronted with difficult, unclear, or indecipherable docu-
ments should adopt deliberate interpretative preferences.  For example, 
recognizing “[t]he imperfect symbolism of language, the property own-
er’s limited understanding of the instrument’s details, the dynamics of 
the estate planning process and the potential for lawyer error and incom-
petence,”42 Professor Mary Louise Fellows argues that a court, interpret-
                                                                                                                                     
is seeking, is the writer of the document . . . .  [T]he “plain meaning” is simply the meaning of the 
people who did not write the document.’”) (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 33, at 198). 
 36. Hancher, supra note 13, at 521. 
 37. See, e.g., Hancher, supra note 13, at 513–14; Robertson, supra note 30, at 1109–10 (some-
times even “clear” legal language is inadequate, precisely because language has a “firm and long 
settled and well understood meaning” so default rules are necessary to fill gaps). 
 38. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417–
18 (1899) (cited in Storrow, supra note 27, at 72). 
 39. See Storrow, supra note 27, at 72. 
 40. Robertson, supra note 30, at 1049. 
 41. Id. at 1047. 
 42. See Fellows, supra note 15, at 634–35.  Fellows questions the “classical liberal conception” 
that a court’s goal is to discover a property owner’s subjective intent and, in furthering that intent, to 
promote individual autonomy; rather, she argues, a court can never know an individual’s actual 
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ing a will that fails to provide definitive guidance as to how property 
should be distributed, can make the document meaningful and avoid in-
consistencies by preferring results that provide property owners with 
“competent” estate planning or, as she calls it, “equal planning under the 
law.”43 Professor Kent Greenawalt advocates a “pluralist” approach, 
which takes into account not simply the testator’s intent as manifested in 
the will’s specific language, but a host of other factors particular to the 
specific will being examined.44  Other scholars have proposed and ex-
amined methods for correcting specific types of mistakes, such as lapse 
or scrivener’s errors.45  All of these approaches replace “fixed rules that 
produce predictable results” with more flexible tactics “designed to ef-
fectuate the presumed intent of the donor where the language of the dis-
positive instrument fails to achieve that result.”46 
A final group of scholars focuses on the assumptions that permeate 
and infect the traditional will-interpretation doctrine, although they do 
not necessarily advocate alternative approaches to interpretation.  For 
example, Professor Melanie Leslie uses cases discussing undue influence 
and will formalities to show that many will contests are flawed by nor-
mative assumptions that pervade our courts and lead them to prefer re-
                                                                                                                                     
subjective intent as distinct from how that intent is manifested in words and actions.  Precisely be-
cause of language’s inadequacy, such manifestations are often unclear or inadequate and provide no 
definitive guidance as to how the property should be distributed, leading courts to impute more 
generalized intent, which sometimes provides a barrier to reform.  Fellows illustrates her ideas by 
considering how this preference for equal planning under the law can eliminate anomalies between 
formal wills and will substitutes, id. at 614–20, and can temper the reluctance to modify an estate 
plan where the property owner becomes incompetent, id. at 621–30. 
 43. Id. at 613.  For example, this approach would “extend[] to incompetents the benefits of 
sound estate planning strategies” while “support[ing] a state’s preference for an estate plan that 
minimizes income and transfer taxes” and “remain[s] flexible for as long as possible.”  Id. at 626. 
 44. See Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 555 (“Courts might rely on: the general, or ordinary, 
sense of words and phrases, allowing greater or lesser attention to the context in which the words 
and phrases are used; the sense of individuals situated as was the writer; the writer’s own sense of 
the words he has employed; the writer’s specific intentions for dealing with a situation; his broader 
purposes in disposing of his estate; or his hypothetical intentions about what he would have unders-
tood or wanted if he had focused on the situation.”).  Greenawalt describes pluralism as a “practical 
concept, that interpretation to discern meaning is not reducible to a single inquiry.  Pluralists believe 
that meaning will vary among disciplines and among subfields within disciplines,” id. at 535, ulti-
mately requiring consideration, to different degrees, of the “testator’s idiosyncratic formulations” 
and his “presumed intentions.”  Id. at 556–57.  So, for example, courts should correct mistakes in 
wills, a pluralist would argue, by “giv[ing] effect to words as the words are understood by those who 
write them, if there is powerful, acceptable evidence that this understanding deviates from general 
usage.”  Id. at 566. 
 45. See, e.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scrivener’s Errors: The 
Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); James A. Henderson, Jr., Mistake and 
Fraud in Wills—Part II: A Suggested Statutory Departure, 47 B.U. L. REV. 461 (1967). 
 46. Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and Atypical Testator, 
80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 389 (2001) (emphasis added). 
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sults that reinforce traditional values.47  Similarly, Professor Frances H. 
Foster documents how inheritance case law, legislation, and reform pro-
posals are locked within an inflexible “family paradigm” that has distinct 
human and individual costs.48  Finally, in a particularly heartfelt essay 
sparked by language in the wills of her father and father-in-law, who 
died within a “nightmarish six-week period,”49 Professor Jane B. Baron, 
who has written extensively on language, interpretation, and property 
law,50 describes the individualized stories in wills that readers of the texts 
often ignore.51  Recognizing that even as a will is viewed as an “unfet-
tered expression of individual choices,”52 a will is a communal endeavor 
because, for example, it depends on an audience to read and effectuate its 
commands.53  By challenging traditional methods of interpretation, these 
scholars urge a reader—an interpreter—to take a more self-conscious 
approach to the assumptions underlying what is characterized as a search 
for donative intent. 
                                                            
 47. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996) 
(“A careful review of case law, however, reveals that many courts do not exalt testamentary freedom 
above all other principles. Notwithstanding frequent declarations to the contrary, many courts are as 
committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in accordance with prevailing normative 
views as they are to effectuating testamentary intent.”); see also Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue 
Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1997) (“[R]ather than furthering freedom of testation, the 
undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed 
testamentary norms. . . .”).  Professor Leslie shows how courts manipulate doctrine to impose on 
testators a duty to provide for those beneficiaries that the court views as having a superior moral 
claim; this “unspoken rule, seeping quietly but fervently from the case law,” Leslie observes, “di-
rectly conflicts with the oft-repeated axiom that testamentary freedom is the polestar of wills law.”  
Leslie, supra, at 236. 
 48. Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 21, at 200–01 (“In a world where the individual has 
emerged from the tyranny of the abstract, inheritance law continues to define people by family cate-
gories.  Decedents and their survivors remain first and foremost spouses, parents, children, and sibl-
ings rather than individuals with particular human needs and circumstances that increasingly defy 
conventional family norms.”). 
 49. Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 633. 
 50. See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917 
(2010); Jane B. Baron, The Rhetoric of Law and Literature: A Skeptical View, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2273 (2005); Jane B. Baron, The “No Property” Problem: Understanding Poverty by Understanding 
Wealth, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1000 (2004); Jane B. Baron, The Expressive Transparency of Property, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 208 (2002); Jane B. Baron, Language Matters, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163 
(2000) [hereinafter Baron, Language Matters]; Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of 
Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059 (1999); Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 
45 BUFF. L. REV. 141 (1997); Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1989); 
Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity and Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 
1056–58 (1987) [hereinafter Baron, Empathy] (describing how even when courts, juries, and com-
mentators speak about testamentary capacity in terms of objective rationality, they require empathy 
to consider whether the individual’s will is consistent with her preferences during life). 
 51. Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 656–69. 
 52. Id. at 650. 
 53. Id. at 656. 
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Although the various theories on how best to interpret—or not to 
interpret—wills differ in important ways, each proponent focuses primar-
ily on poorly drafted testamentary documents and proposes convincing 
arguments for how a court should or should not analyze the ambiguities, 
fill any gaps, and reform any mistakes.54  In other words, the essential 
purpose of current wills scholarship appears to be improving the law of 
wills, but only by providing future interpreters—usually courts—with 
theories and strategies to “figure out what some purposive agent in-
tended.”55  Recognizing that drafting wills is a difficult business and that 
authorial intent is key,56 wills scholars nevertheless fail to consider how 
drafters might choose language to express and memorialize the testator’s 
intent from inception and instead focus almost exclusively on intent-
effectuating rules. 
B.  Moving Beyond Interpretation to Formulation, 
Creation, and Communication 
The scarce treatment of writing in the scholarly dialogue about 
wills appears to be based on one or more assumptions.  First, a notion 
exists that, for the most part, competent lawyers draft valid wills that, in 
the “overwhelming majority” of instances, will never be contested or 
questioned.57  Second, some of the literature conversely posits that even 
                                                            
 54. See, e.g., Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 659–60 (“Where a will’s verbal commands seem 
clear (in the sense of being complete, comprehensible, and in accord with the reader’s expectations), 
the richness of the ‘under-story’ can be comfortably ignored; the words of the will can be followed.  
But where a will’s words are unclear (incomplete, internally inconsistent, ambiguous, at odds with 
expectations), the under story is what we most want to know.”); Robertson, supra note 30, at 1064 
(“If [the would-be donor’s] wishes are complex and he secures competent estate planning advice and 
counsel, his skillfully drafted donative document will almost certainly enjoy judicial approval and 
realize in fact his actual intent. . . . But where the will is not so well written, where the donative 
document admits of ambiguity and mistake or its meaning is otherwise problematic . . . our approach 
matters most.”); Storrow, supra note 27, at 67 (arguing that “too flexible interpretive rules” allow 
courts to ignore will ambiguities and seeking “a renewed understanding of the distinction between 
interpretation and construction” to curb courts’ “limitless discretion”). 
 55. Fish, No Textualist Position, supra note 14, at 646. 
 56. See Gerry W. Beyer, Avoiding the Estate Planning “Blue Screen of Death”—Common 
Non-Tax Errors and How to Prevent Them, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 61, 82–93 
(2008) (describing various will drafting errors and ways to avoid them) [hereinafter Beyer, Blue 
Screen]; Garvey, supra note 29, at 47 (“Few estate planning lawyers would argue with the idea that 
drafting a competent will or trust requires ‘hard thinking and patient labor.’”) (quoting W. BARTON 
LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON THE LAW OF WILLS 234 (2d ed. 1955)); Storrow, supra note 27, at 65 
(“On the one hand, language is imperfect because it fails as a tool of prognostication.  On the other 
hand, language is imperfect because it fails to live up to a role it should play—to serve as a set of 
signs capable of representing an author’s intention.  Given the paramount importance of intention in 
the law of wills, this latter imperfection of language makes responsible estate planning a perilous 
undertaking.”). 
 57. Robertson, supra note 30, at 1055; see also Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 667–68 
(“Sometimes stories will be unnecessary.  Most cases will not be contested.  However ‘remote’ the 
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the most careful of estate planners cannot always express a testator’s de-
sires adequately or completely.  Not only is language imperfect, accord-
ing to this line of thought, but also the simple processes of using a legal 
vocabulary and thinking about the testator’s needs in terms of “available 
legal categories and devices” affect how a testator perceives, formulates, 
and defines her intent.58  Accordingly, even while recognizing that 
“[r]eal people, not abstractions, write wills,” at least one scholar focuses 
on encouraging interpreters to “seek the human voice” behind the words, 
rather than encouraging testators and their drafting lawyers to write that 
story into the document.59  Third, some of the articles imply that examin-
ing intent-effectuating rather than intent-creating concepts is substantive-
ly more helpful because placing “the onus on testators to expound their 
wishes—whether present or anticipated—within an executed writing” 
may have significant downsides, such as the imperfection of human fore-
sight, the legal expenses associated with planning for contingencies, and 
the cognitive costs that arise when individuals confront the unpleasant 
prospect of death.60  With several notable exceptions,61 any serious de-
bate about will drafting seems to be viewed as a subject more appropriate 
for the practicing bar62 than for scholarly examination, discussion, and 
debate. 
                                                                                                                                     
words of attorney-drafted instruments may be from the ordinary stories told by the testator in his 
own words, the ‘legal words’ can function tolerably well to achieve dispositive objectives.  Indeed, 
this is the result for which so many responsible estate planners strive, and mostly succeed.”); Tate, 
supra note 30, at 144. 
 58. See, e.g., Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 647–48; Champine, supra note 46, at 389–90 
(arguing that “[t]he movement away from fixed rules in the law of wills” has enjoyed support pri-
marily because “safe harbors permit careful testators to preclude litigation over intent and protect 
against the possibility that intent will be discerned inaccurately . . . .”); Fellows, supra note 15, at 
633–34 (“That clients are remote from their instruments does not mean that lawyers garbled their 
clients’ donative intent.  It does, however, increase the possibility that donative intent will be garbled 
because clients are less able to review the legal translations of their donative intent.  Although a 
good lawyer will try to explain the various provisions to the client, the level of detail and the eco-
nomic constraints of the planning process make it impossible for the property owner to understand, 
let alone make an informed choice about, all the issues that arise.”); Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 
564–65 (describing the many types of mistakes a testator might make in drafting a will, including 
using language that fails to accomplish its intended purpose, omitting key language, using terms with 
precise legal significance and application that the testator does not understand, or misunderstanding 
circumstances in the external world). 
 59. Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 664–69. 
 60. Adam Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 609, 623 & n.74 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Text and Time]. 
 61. See supra note 37. 
 62. See generally Beyer, Blue Screen, supra note 56 (describing estate planning best practices); 
Gerry W. Beyer, Drafting in Contemplation of Will Contests, 38 No. 1 PRAC. LAW. 61 (1992) (de-
scribing how to draft to avoid will contests) [hereinafter Beyer, Will Contests]; Timothy P. 
O’Sullivan, Family Harmony: An All Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate Planning Process, 8 
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 253 (2007) (providing practical, including drafting, suggestions for estate 
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There is room, and indeed need, for wills scholarship to be less 
myopic.  Even if scholars identify how courts prefer certain prevailing 
themes or act inconsistently in their approaches to resolving ambiguities, 
we present only a partial solution if we limit our inquiry to considering 
how courts should interpret the problematic instruments more effective-
ly.  To the contrary, these themes influence how wills are written, and we 
will be better equipped to counter the prejudices and default rules that 
exert power over outcomes63 if we also look at that pre-interpretative 
stage.  In other words, by systematically exploring strategies for and 
questioning limits on will writing, scholars can ultimately help produce a 
better body of substantive wills law. 
In an effort to fill the current gap, this Article provides a long-
overdue look at will creation and, more specifically, the potential advan-
tages and disadvantages of expanding the traditional, contained, and 
formulaic language of wills to be more varied and expressive.  To this 
end, the balance of this Article posits that testamentary documents can 
and should be drafted to include language that is more individualized, 
evocative, and expressive, and to include a testator’s story, her life vi-
sion, or at the very least, details about the people and property referenced 
in the will.  Drafters need not set forth this language in separate, non-
testamentary side letters and need not avoid using language that is “pre-
catory” rather than essential.64  Rather than exposing the legal text to in-
creased ambiguity and therefore litigation, allowing expressive writing to 
infuse the otherwise rigid language of traditional will forms has signifi-
cant benefits. 
III.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EXPRESSIVE LANGUAGE IN WILLS 
The idea that a testator should think about her will carefully and in-
clude a written explanation and expression of her wishes seems obvious, 
and yet, as the cases that will be discussed in Part IV show, wills lan-
guage clings fiercely to formula.  Before surveying examples of wills 
from case law, this Part discusses the potential advantages of an ap-
proach to drafting wills that would be more nuanced and diverse, less 
mechanical and rigid.  First, recognizing the relationship between writing 
                                                                                                                                     
plans that increase rather than disrupt family harmony); Smith, supra note 9 (describing how to draft 
testaments); cf. Pruett, supra note 31 (describing drafting approaches from fiduciary’s perspective). 
 63. See, e g., Leslie, supra note 47, at 243–67. 
 64. Precatory language consists of words that recommend, rather than command or direct, a 
course of conduct.  Frank L. Schiavo, Does the Use of “Request,” “Wish,” or “Desire” Create a 
Precatory Trust or Not?, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 647, 650–51 (2006); see also GEORGE T. 
BOGERT, TRUSTS § 19 (6th ed., West 1987) (“The words ‘request,’ ‘desire,’ and the like, do not 
naturally import to most persons a legal obligation . . . .”).  In other words, precatory language is 
language of guidance rather than direction, wishes rather than demands, stories rather than strictures. 
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and cognition, this Part argues that using richer language in wills influ-
ences the testator’s formulation of her intent about how she wants to 
build her legacy.  Second, a will, and indeed any testamentary document, 
is not only a legally binding statement of the decedent’s individual wish-
es, but also a communal instrument that affects others apart from its 
maker.65  By creating a will that strives to be expressive, this Part posits, 
a testator may share her intent more effectively with her various au-
diences and thereby reap benefits that go beyond pure legal validity.  
Third, expressive language enables a lawyer drafting a will to incorpo-
rate the testator’s voice more effectively, helping to avert contests over 
ambiguous intent.  Fourth, and finally, expressive language aids the 
grieving to understand and reconcile themselves with the testator’s wish-
es.  Although there are costs to including expressive language in wills, 
including complicating an already difficult planning process66 and pro-
viding increased opportunity for “dead hand” control,67 encouraging a 
testator to consider weaving aspects of her personal narrative68 into her 
will also has advantages that should not be undervalued or routinely re-
jected. 
                                                            
 65. See Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 649–52; see also Foster, Trust Privacy, supra note 23, 
at 567–610 (documenting the benefits and costs of trust privacy for creators, beneficiaries, creditors, 
and fiduciaries); Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate Plan-
ning Defaults for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 313 (1996) (recognizing attorneys’ 
ethical obligations to clients’ spouses and children when presenting estate planning options and 
especially traditional default planning devices). 
 66. See infra text accompanying notes 127–30. 
 67. See infra text accompanying notes 150–54. 
 68. Legal storytelling and narrative theory have continued to spark interest in recent years, 
especially in the legal writing community.  See, e.g., J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative 
Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53 (2008) (describ-
ing persuasive value of narrative in the law); Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and 
Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s 
Journey, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 767, 773 (2006) (“We understand narrative because we join the 
story and see ourselves as part of it: We place ourselves into the story and walk with the charac-
ters.”).  For depictions of the power of narrative and legal storytelling generally, see LAW’S STORIES 
(Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (collecting essays that describe the relationships between 
and power of law, rhetoric, narrative, and storytelling); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat 
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and 
Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 578 (1992) (describing how using storytelling techniques in 
legal discourse can disrupt traditional assumptions and counteract discrimination specifically with 
respect to gay and lesbian individuals); and Lani Guinier, Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dis-
sent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26–27 n.112 (2008) (observing how stories are “not just a series of intel-
lectual or abstract claims in service of a principle” but rather a powerful tool to “‘dis-
rupt . . . rationalizing, generalizing modes of analysis with a reminder of human beings and their 
feelings, quirky developments, and textured vitality. . . .  And stories at the moment seem better able 
to evoke realms of meaning, remembrance, commitment, and human agency than some other me-
thods of human explanation.’”) (quoting Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW’S STORIES, supra, 
at 24, 36).  For a discussion of storytelling in the context of wills, see infra note 95. 
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A.  Expressive Writing as a Tool for the Testator to Formulate Intent 
It would be folly to claim that how a thought is expressed, and more 
particularly how it is written, does not matter to its writer.69  Each choice 
about what language to include or omit changes the way the author ana-
lyzes and understands the idea’s substance.70  For that reason, scholars, 
in the context of judicial decision making, have explained that the very 
process of writing an idea down helps discipline the judge’s thoughts; 
judges speak of how recognizing that a decision “just won’t write” often 
leads them to rethink the result’s underpinnings and workability.71  The 
crafting is inextricably tied to the author’s process of carrying the idea to 
completion, and the written expression of an idea has importance inde-
pendent of the idea’s content. 
                                                            
 69. Characterized by written opinions, statutes, and agreements, written language occupies a 
sphere that is central to American law.  See Richard A. Posner, Judge’s Writing Styles (and Do They 
Matter), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447 (1995) (discussing how the “pure” and “impure” style of 
written decisions correlates to the judge’s thought and purpose); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Law and 
Literature, YALE REV. (1925), reprinted in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 3–5 (1931) (arguing that in law, as in letters, “[f]orm is not something added to sub-
stance as a mere protuberant adornment.  The two are fused into unity.”).  But cf. Guinier, supra note 
68, at 24–28 (discussing the difference between spoken and written communication and, in particu-
lar, the unique power of judicial dissents delivered orally). 
 70. See Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1283, 1284–85, 1303–04 (2008) (considering the complicated relationship between writing 
and reasoning by referring to “psychological research on the relationship between verbalization and 
problem solving”); J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 
WASH. L. REV. 35, 55 (1994) (describing cognitive and epistemic components of writing and observ-
ing that “[w]riting is used not only to communicate knowledge, but also to generate knowledge. That 
is, writing plays a role in thinking.”); see also Elaine Ellis-Stone, Appendix I Letter, in BARRY K. 
BAINES, M.D., ETHICAL WILLS: PUTTING YOUR VALUES ON PAPER 98, 99 (2d ed. 2006) (“Not only 
does writing help me clarify my thoughts; it also gives me something tangible to return to over time 
to measure how my thinking has evolved.”); Posner, supra note 69, at 1447 (using examples of the 
“pure” and “impure” opinion-writing style to argue that style and content are interrelated and that 
words can both “enable” and “substitute for” thought). 
 71. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Deci-
sionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 994 (2009) (“[T]he mere act of drafting an opinion—crafting a 
coherent and believable explanation of how a decision flows from the relevant facts and legal au-
thorities—can sometimes ensure that the decision accords with the governing law. Often, a judge 
will discover an error in reasoning when she realizes that the opinion ‘just won’t write’ as she had 
conceived it.”); Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 181, 183 (1941) (describ-
ing how Justice Brandeis “spent no less time in the expression of thought than in its conception”); 
Kenneth F. Ripple, Legal Writing in the New Millennium: Lessons from a Special Teacher and a 
Special “Classroom,” 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925, 926 (1999) (describing how “writing was not 
just a means of communication” for Chief Justice Warren E. Burger but rather “a necessary tool for 
thinking through the most difficult problems”); Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opi-
nions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 50 (2005) (“Every judge has had 
the experience of finding that an initial decision just ‘won’t write,’ and thus every judge knows that 
it is manifestly untrue that reasoning and writing can be separated.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric 
of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374–75 (1995) 
(discussing the “true test” of a judicial opinion as coming when a judge “reasons it out on paper (or 
on computer)” and observing that “ [r]hetoric will always be tied to import and permanence”). 
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And the writing of a will has personal as well as legal significance.  
People write wills as a way to take control of death and to put their “af-
fairs in order.”72  A simple document naming an executor and disposing 
of property may facilitate transfers on death and spare loved ones from 
an added burden at the moment of their own suffering and loss.73  The 
resulting planning document often lives securely in a bank safe-deposit 
box or a home safe.74  Whether purchased as a form document,75 home-
made,76 or created by a lawyer who specializes in estate planning, the 
                                                            
 72. See Foster, Family Paradigm, supra note 21, at 242–43 (Inheritance can “promote greater 
continuity in the decedent’s survivors’ lives” and “can ensure a continued connection with a de-
ceased loved one.  The property that survives a death is often a repository of memories, a tangible 
reminder of a life shared.”).  See generally Emily Berendt & Laura Lynn Michaels, Your HIV Posi-
tive Client: Easing the Burden on the Family Through Estate Planning, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
509 (1991) (describing the unique emotional issues that arise for people dying from HIV-related 
illnesses and recognizing the role estate planning can play to ease burdens).  But see Hirsch, Text 
and Time, supra note 60, at 623 n.74 (people avoid details of planning because of death’s unplea-
santness and reluctance to face mortality); Sneddon, supra note 29, at 6–7 & nn.16–18 (describing 
reasons for individuals’ reluctance to execute wills); Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will Forms—
The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV. 769, 771–72 
(1993) (same). 
 73. The Uniform Probate Code defines a will as “a codicil and any testamentary instrument 
that merely appoints an executor, revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly 
excludes or limits the right of an individual or class to succeed to the property of the decedent.”  
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-201(57) (2010). Wills are defined differently depending on jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 88 (West 2010) (“‘Will’ includes codicil and any testamentary instru-
ment which merely appoints an executor or revokes or revises another will.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3B:1-2 (West 2010) (“‘Will’ means the last will and testament of a testator or testatrix and in-
cludes any codicil and any testamentary instrument that merely appoints an executor, revokes or 
revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of a person or 
class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession.”); N.Y. EST. POWERS & 
TR. L. § 1-2.19 (McKinney 2010) (will is an oral declaration or written instrument that takes effect 
on death and disposes of property or exercises power of appointment or appoints fiduciary); 20 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (West 2010) (“‘Will[]’ [m]eans a written will, codicil or other testamentary 
writing.”). 
 74. See, e.g., Carter v. Estate of Davis, 813 N.E.2d 1209, 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (referring 
to testator’s will being kept in safe-deposit box); In re Nalls, 998 So. 2d 697, 698 (La. 2009) (per 
curiam) (same). 
 75. See Horton, supra note 20, at 1675, 1682 & n.33, 1718–19 & nn.204–12 (2008) (describing 
modern proliferation of “do-it-yourself books and software” that have spurred a “boom in home-
grown estate planning”) (citations omitted). 
 76. If properly witnessed, homemade wills are not treated any differently than attorney-drafted 
wills.  Without proper attestation, however, a homemade will may be recognized as a holographic 
will so long as it is signed and in the testator’s handwriting.  Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph 
Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. L. REV. 93, 93 n.2 (2006); Hirsch, Inhe-
ritance and Inconsistency, supra note 8, at 1071 & n.40 (describing holographic will statutes).  As 
Brown’s article illustrates, holographs are still controversial.  See Brown, supra, at 123 (arguing that 
homemade wills give rise to greater validity and interpretation disputes).  But see Stephen Clowney, 
In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 70–71 (2008) (examining 145 holographic wills from Allegheny County Penn-
sylvania during five-year period from 1990–95 and concluding that the holographs were not any 
more likely to spark litigation than other testamentary instruments). 
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will, like the deed to a person’s home, is without question treated by its 
maker as something important.  Indeed, much has been made of the for-
malism and seriousness surrounding will-execution ceremonies.77 
Ironically though, most testators make little real contribution to the 
language used in the documents that result from the planning and draft-
ing process.  Notwithstanding the obvious need for a testator to under-
stand what her will does and says, clients frequently express confusion 
and surprise at the formulaic and legalistic writing.78  Drafters are never-
theless encouraged not to veer from standard language and not to include 
background information, explanation, or any other “precatory” or unne-
cessary words.79  Truly written in an insider’s private language, a will 
                                                            
 77. See, e.g., Joseph Karl Grant, Shattering and Moving Beyond the Gutenberg Paradigm: The 
Dawn of the Electronic Will, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 122 (2008) (“[M]ost estate planning 
attorneys . . . will tell you that preparation and execution of a will is a process fraught with ritualism 
and formality.”); Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 8, at 1060 (“Inheritance law 
stands on ceremony.”); Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1994) (“Wills have always been creatures of form rather than sub-
stance.”). 
 78. When a will is presented for signature, the testator must: 
be capable of knowing and understanding in a general way the nature and extent of his or 
her property, the natural objects of his or her bounty and the disposition that he or she is 
making of that property, and must also be capable of relating these elements to one 
another . . . . 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(b) (2003).  Will-
execution ceremonies typically involve the testator acknowledging aloud to her witnesses that she 
has read the will, she knows what it says, and she has made it willingly as her free act, so that the 
witnesses can attest to the will and sign self-proving affidavits too.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§§ 2-502 & 2-504 (2010); Beyer, Will Contests, supra note 62, at 70 (describing “best practices” 
colloquy for will-execution ceremony to include questions such as “[h]ave you carefully read this 
will and do you understand it?”).  Frequently, when asked to recite this basic understanding, testators 
look to the estate planning attorneys with a nervous laugh and exclaim that they tried to understand 
“the legalese” and are relying on the lawyers’ advice to sign.  See, e.g., Baron, Stories, supra note 
13, at 633 (“My father-in-law . . . had his will drafted by an attorney.  No matter how many times I 
or the will’s scrivener explained its provisions to him, he professed not to understand its terms.”). 
 79. See, e.g., JULE E. STOCKER ET AL., DRAWING WILLS AND TRUSTS § 1:5 (PLI 2001) (de-
scribing drafter’s objective, whether will drafted in formal or “plain English” style, as avoiding 
language that would expose the will to challenge); Paul B. Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate 
Planning, 43 B.U. L. Rev. 179, 196 (1963) (“[G]o slow on explaining in the will the reason for 
omitting a legacy. One lady insisted on: ‘I leave nothing to my nephew George for reasons I am sure 
he will appreciate.’  He didn’t and a will contest ensued.”); Smith, supra note 9, at 73 (“Most attor-
neys have never considered including a client’s personal testament in the wills they draft.”).  Specif-
ically avoiding precatory language appears to be a directive of many in the estate planning world.  
See, e.g., Beyer, Blue Screen, supra note 56, at 88 (“Precatory language has no place in a will.  If the 
testator wishes to express nonmandatory desires, then the attorney should use a separate non-
testamentary document.  If the testator insists on placing such language in the will, then the attorney 
should add language indicating that the suggestions are merely precatory and have no binding ef-
fect.”); Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of Precatory Words 
in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (2007) (“When a donor uses precatory language, he or she 
descends into a legal no-man’s-land, in which the instructions may be enforceable or may be disre-
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often provides the testator with no more than a “limited understanding of 
the instrument’s details.”80  While “determining and assisting in the for-
mulation of the donor’s intention is a primary counseling function,” one 
prominent scholar has observed, “it is apparently one of the most neg-
lected aspects of estate planning” resulting in instruments that “too fre-
quently . . . provide no guidance as to . . . purpose and scope.”81 
Where the modern trend is to criticize legalese in general,82 legalese 
has been defended in the specific context of wills for helping evidence 
the seriousness of the endeavor.83  Indeed, the “stylized, often redundant, 
linguistic formulae found within testamentary instruments” has been 
praised for setting the occasion apart from everyday life.84  It is by no 
means intuitive, however, that the solemn purpose of wills justifies sacri-
ficing the testator’s connection and self-conscious attention to the docu-
ment that she uses to transmit her property to the community she leaves 
behind.85  To the contrary, “[t]hough the words of a will typically follow 
certain traditions of form, these are not required by law.”86 
A will has the potential to express the individualism, autonomy, 
and personal freedom that are inherent to the liberalism of American so-
                                                                                                                                     
garded.”); James C. Rehberg, Wills, Trusts and Administration of Estates, 48 MERCER L. REV. 565, 
580 (1996) (observing that precatory language in a will is “an invitation to litigation”). 
 80. Fellows, supra note 15, at 634; see also Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 549 (“[P]eople often 
may not understand complex provisions in their own wills.”). 
 81. Halbach, supra note 23, at 1433–34.  Professor Halbach refers in a footnote to the “many 
available check lists for estate planning that elaborately detail the facts to be determined about the 
client’s assets and the possible objects of his bounty but fail to list the recurring questions about the 
donor’s intentions.”  Id. at 1434 n.47. 
 82. See, e.g., RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (5th ed. 2005); DAVID 
MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 107–08 (2008). 
 83. See Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 8, at 1064–65 (“The arcane minuet 
of the will-execution ceremony, like the marriage ceremony, serves to impress upon the testator that 
on this occasion her words will count, that this is no time for idle banter.”). 
 84. Id. at 1063–64 (denouncing critics who have “railed against the ‘ponderous phrases and 
legalistic mumbo jumbo’” and the “‘solemn hocus-pocus’” appearing in will) (quoting, respectively, 
NORMAN F. DACEY, HOW TO AVOID PROBATE—UPDATED! 555 (1980), and FRED RODELL, WOE 
UNTO YOU LAWYERS! 185 (1939)). 
 85. See SHAFFER ET AL., DRAFTING WILLS, supra note 23, at 175 (“Dispositive instruments, to 
a greater extent than business contracts and corporate forms, retain a level of legalese that betrays a 
black-magic theory of interpersonal relations in the law office—an inarticulate fear that everything 
the relatively undereducated 19th century lawyer used had cabalistic significance; although a modern 
person is incapable of understanding it, it is vital to a document’s success.  Law, according to this 
theory, is witch-doctoring with a pencil and drafting is half exposition and half ritual.”); Fellows, 
supra note 15, at 633 (describing how lawyers “will avoid unique word usages” and use “[l]egal 
boilerplate provisions” that “create a remoteness between property owners and the instruments pur-
porting to reflect their donative intent”). 
 86. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 8, at 1064. 
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ciety.87  Some scholars have recognized such promise by charting how 
“deviant” and “defiant” testamentary transfers affected the sexual and 
racial order of the antebellum South and nineteenth-century America 
generally.88  Others scholars have acknowledged how individuals define 
themselves through the property (intellectual, fiscal, charitable) they 
create, earn, receive, and own during life;89 how these individuals choose 
to dispose of their property on death is a lasting extension and expression 
of that self-definition and individual determination.90  Indeed, when a 
will is read and interpreted, it is treated as an individualized and personal 
expression because attention is focused on the author’s intent.91 
                                                            
 87. See Baron, Empathy, supra note 50, at 1049 & n.16 (describing how the doctrines of testa-
mentary freedom and capacity, with their emphasis on individual values, “reflect notions that are 
fundamental to liberal political theory”); Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 634 (acknowledging that 
“[t]he rhetoric of wills law portrays wills as exercises of autonomy and self-determination,” but 
recognizing the problems of discovering the testator’s wishes and implementing those wishes neu-
trally); Susanna L. Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary 
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 966–76 (2006) (describing early 
history of wills law, starting with the Roman Republic and Blackstone’s England, which imposed 
moral limits on testamentary freedom, to Revolutionary America, which sought to balance demands 
of individual liberty, equality, family protection, and the needs of commerce, to the era of “Common 
Sense,” which recognized virtually limitless individual autonomy in will making); cf. Cathrine O. 
Frank, Of Testaments and Tattoos: The Wills Act of 1837 and Rider Haggard’s Mr. Meeson’s Will 
(1888), 18 L. & LIT. 323, 325–26 (2006) (describing how the Wills Act of 1837 transformed the will 
into a specifically written document which became an “objectified extension of the testator’s subjec-
tive self” and its “institution as a document . . . like the birth and marriage certificate” that functions 
“rhetorically” as the “testator’s legal identity”). 
 88. See Blumenthal, supra note 87, at 959; Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and 
Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 236, 285–87 (1999).  These intriguing ar-
ticles highlight the possibility that testamentary freedom offers, even as they illuminate the en-
trenched and deeply troubling attitudes towards women, race, sexuality, and the existing restrictive 
social order that governed. 
 89. See Blumenthal, supra note 87, at 964 (examining several hundred will contests brought 
over the course of the nineteenth century and concluding that the trials concerned not only property 
but also more importantly “fundamental questions about the bounds of human freedom, the meaning 
of mental health, and the very constitution of the self”); Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of 
Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 975 (1999) (using disputes over mortal remains to explore the “fam-
ily-decedent tension” in the law of wills and arguing that this tension “can be alleviated with a dee-
per understanding of the importance of decedent autonomy in coming to terms with death and in 
determining who is family beyond the confines of biological ties”).  See generally Jeremy A. Blu-
menthal, “To Be Human”: A Psychological Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609 
(2009) (recognizing the relationship between property ownership and psychology and surveying 
empirical research in the discipline); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
957 (1982) (discussing property’s relationship to personhood); Williams, supra note 20 (explaining 
the different philosophical and scholarly rhetoric of property, including intuitive absolutism, com-
munalism, republican egalitarianism, romantic homeownership, liberal dignity, possessive indivi-
dualism, and pragmatism). 
 90. See, e.g., Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 673 (“As has frequently been noted, there is no 
doubting the association in our legal and social theory between property and modernist, liberal no-
tions of individual autonomy.”). 
 91. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15. 
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Although formulaic language, like will-execution formalities, 
serves a “channeling” and ritual function,92 this language becomes prob-
lematic when it is adopted without mindful consideration of alternatives.  
Thinking purposefully and self-consciously about language in whatever 
form—be it reading great literature, composing poetry, or more perti-
nently, choosing carefully the description for an item of personal proper-
ty or a beloved friend or relative—keeps authors “aware of the kinds of 
magic language can perform.”93  This recognition is by no means a direc-
tive to write well or in any particular manner because what is considered 
“good writing” is as subjective today as it was when Justice Cardozo 
wrote on the topic nearly a hundred years ago.94  Rather, this line of rea-
soning acknowledges that by refusing to write robotically and instead 
choosing language that requires precision, variety, and thoughtfulness, 
by drafting with a “rich texture” that includes “emotion and particulari-
ty,” a will can allow the testator to tell her story and thereby “help con-
nect us to the person the testator was.”95  Attention to a will’s language is 
thus crucial to the formulation of testamentary intent in the first instance. 
B.  Expressive Writing as a Tool for the Testator to Communicate Intent 
In addition to assisting a testator in formulating her intent, purpose-
ful choices about how and when to use descriptive language and personal 
narrative also contribute to the testator’s ability to convey her intent to 
                                                            
 92. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 
YALE L.J. 1, 2–5, 9–10 (1941); see also Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 558–59 (Will formalities 
“help guide those who consult lawyers or look at will forms to accomplish their objectives.  In addi-
tion to providing precise language with clear legal effect, lawyers can suggest previously unconsi-
dered contingent possibilities and legal devices to allocate control of property and minimize tax 
burdens.”); Langbein, Compliance, supra note 13, at 494 (describing how compliance with formali-
ties lowers routine costs of administration because “[c]ourts are seldom left to puzzle whether [a] 
document was meant to be a will”). 
 93. Margaret Turano, Moments of Grace: Lawyers Reading Literature, 72 N.Y. ST. B.J. 12, 13 
(Oct. 2000). 
 94. CARDOZO, supra note 69, at 9–10 (recognizing the many and diverse styles of effective 
writers); see also Baron, Language Matters, supra note 50, at 178 (“[L]egal language is often por-
trayed as dry and insensitive, in implicit contrast to language outside legal contexts, which is pre-
sumably rich and nuanced.  However, some legal language (think of Cardozo’s famous decisions) is 
obviously rich and nuanced, while language outside of law is often dry or insensitive.”); Posner, 
supra note 69, at 1422–25 (describing and defining style in the context of judicial opinion writing as 
communication, ornament, literature, and signature). 
 95. Baron, Stories, supra note 13, at 676; see also Baron, Language Matters, supra note 50, at 
178–80 (recognizing the importance of deliberate and nuanced language to combat the persistent and 
entrenched stereotypes, expectations, and formulae in the law).  Even as critics and proponents of the 
different approaches to interpretation acknowledge that transmitting intent is complex, some also 
recognize the importance of listening to individual stories to help avoid dangerous patterns into 
which readers and writers alike fall at their peril.  See generally Baron, Stories, supra note 13. 
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her various audiences.96  “Last words” have received special attention 
throughout history based in part on a belief that in the final moments of 
life, a person has examined her path and perhaps can impart some wis-
dom about how it has unfolded.97  For this reason, historians and anthol-
ogists have observed, memorialized, celebrated, and even manipulated 
the last words of famous and ordinary people.98  Artists from William 
Shakespeare99 to Orson Welles100 have created or spoken memorable 
lines to mark their characters’ final moments.  These last words have a 
talismanic quality or, in the words of Willa Cather, “oracular signific-
ance.”101 
A will, among any individual’s final communications to her loved 
ones, carries this same potential.  Perhaps for that reason, there is a popu-
lar cultural expectation that upon death the decedent’s loved ones will 
gather to hear her will read aloud.  The execution ceremony is typically 
imbued with ritual precisely because a testator is expected to take the 
will’s words seriously.102  At this crucial and focused moment where lan-
guage takes on added significance, then, the will provides an opportunity 
for the testator to communicate her preferences to her family, her friends, 
and her surrogates (in the form of fiduciaries). 
Rhetoric has been defined as “not merely” the “dress[ing] up [of] 
preexisting truths” but rather “‘the central art by which community and 
culture are established, maintained, and transformed.’”103  A testator can 
fulfill the expectations of her audience—her community—at this key 
moment by selecting her will’s rhetoric with care and precision.  One 
                                                            
 96. See Sneddon, supra note 29, at 31–32. 
 97. GUTHKE, supra note 28, at 3–4.  Professor Guthke proposes other reasons why last words 
have cultural significance, including that they give “some idea that the essence or the truth of a 
life . . . emerges in death,” id. at 49, and “whether confirming a life or breaking with it, could grant a 
kind of secularized immortality.”  Id. at 53. They also possess “meaning and quality best described 
with this admittedly vague term, mystique.”  Id. at 58. 
 98. Id. at 98–154 (describing anthologies of last words that were designed to guide and enter-
tain). 
 99. Id. at 35–47 (discussing Shakespeare’s use of last words). 
 100. Citizen Kane, starring Welles, revolved around a search for the meaning of the main cha-
racter’s last word “Rosebud.”  See THE NEW YORK TIMES GUIDE TO THE 1000 BEST MOVIES EVER 
MADE, UPDATED AND REVISED 186 (Peter M. Nichols ed., 2004); see also GUTHKE, supra note 28, 
at 7–35 (discussing literary use of dying words by diverse writers, including Carlos Fuentes, Willa 
Cather, and Mark Twain). 
 101. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
 102. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 92, at 9–10 (describing “ritual function,” “evidentiary 
function,” and “protective function” of will formalities). 
 103. Williams, supra note 20, at 306 (quoting James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric; Rhetoric 
as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985)); see also id. 
at 360 (using doctrinal chaos that characterizes property rhetoric to show how law students and 
lawyers can become better advocates when they focus not only on logic but also on chaos, inarticu-
lateness, inconsistency, and silences to make their ultimate approach more persuasive to the listener). 
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method of enhancing expressiveness in a will is for the testator to include 
a statement of purpose or explanation in the testamentary instrument.  
Consider, for example, the case In re Estate of Singer, in which a testator 
left his two sons bequests of fifteen thousand dollars, subject to forfeiture 
clauses that would bar recovery by any son who challenged the will, and 
the balance of his vast estate to his daughter.104  This seemingly inequita-
ble result was tempered by the testator’s rhetoric explaining that he chose 
to benefit his daughter and appoint her as fiduciary, “in recognition of 
her unusual dedication to [testator] and for the taking care of [testator.  
Testator] realizes that his daughter gave her life to take care of him and 
feels a great sense of gratitude toward her.”105  Although the sons consi-
dered suing their sister over the disparate inheritance they received, ulti-
mately they decided not to pursue the will challenge.106 
By communicating intent, a testator’s use of expressive language 
can help resolve complicated disputes among beneficiaries over issues 
like property distribution and tax apportionment.107  Consider, for exam-
ple, In re Application of Rhodes, a case involving a substantial estate that 
ended up not having enough cash to pay its taxes and expenses.108  To 
communicate how he intended his property to be distributed, the testator 
included the following expressive language in his will: 
I have given much thought and deliberation to the provisions which 
I make for each of you . . . .  While I have equal love and affection 
for my sons . . . I recognize that I make disproportionate provisions 
for my sons . . . for reasons I deem sufficient.  In arriving at the spe-
cific provisions which I make . . . I have taken into account, among 
other factors, the provisions which I have made for each of them 
during my lifetime, in certain cases my son’s connection with the 
particular assets which I bequeath to him or his issue, and in the 
case of the disposition of my business interests, the efforts certain 
sons have made in helping me run and develop the particular busi-
ness.109 
Although none of the beneficiaries challenged this language, the will, or 
any distributions under it, when the executors sought to impose tax obli-
                                                            
 104. In re Estate of Singer, 920 N.E.2d 943 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009). 
 105. This explanatory language actually appeared in the revocable trust agreement into which 
the will poured.  Id. at 944. 
 106. Although the younger son deposed the testator’s former lawyer, who had drafted seven of 
his prior wills, ultimately the son decided that his sister had not unduly influenced the testator.  Id. at 
945.  The New York Court of Appeals decision involved whether taking the lawyer’s deposition 
triggered applicability of the forfeiture clause.  Id. at 947. 
 107. E.g., In re Application of Rhodes, 868 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516–17 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2008). 
 108. Id. at 514. 
 109. Id. 
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gations on all of the beneficiaries ratably, some objected.110  Luckily, the 
testator’s own expressive language addressed the issue of tax apportion-
ment too, explaining “I have given great consideration as to how I have 
directed that the taxes . . . are to be paid,” and “I believe that the provi-
sions which I have arrived at are equitable for all of my family mem-
bers.”111  Specifically, the will directed the executors to pay taxes for 
three categories of gifts from the residuary estate, but to charge all re-
maining taxes against the gifts themselves.112  When the residue turned 
out to be insufficient to pay taxes on the so-called “preferred gifts,” the 
executors sought to apportion those taxes, treating these gifts identically 
to the non-preferred gifts.113  The court refused, finding the specific lan-
guage of the will required the two sons who received the testator’s busi-
ness interests to bear the tax burden.114 
The court’s reasons behind this ruling related largely to the lan-
guage chosen by the testator to reflect his intent.  First, the court relied 
on the testator’s “great consideration” of “equitable” tax apportionment, 
which did not include the business interests as preferred.115  Second, the 
court was reluctant to allow apportionment of the tax shortfall against the 
less substantial gifts to family members and to a friend who was “de-
scribed by decedent as the person ‘who has looked after me so diligently 
during the later years.’”116  Third, the testator’s language explaining his 
reasons for leaving his sons the business interests helped the court under-
stand how the testator viewed both these very significant gifts and the 
children who received them.117  Although adding expressive language 
may not always help to communicate intent,118 the Rhodes language pro-
                                                            
 110. Id. at 515–16. 
 111. Id. at 515. 
 112. Id. at 515–16. 
 113. Id. at 514. 
 114. See id. at 516 (“the testator’s intent is to be ascertained ‘not from a  single word or phrase 
but from a sympathetic reading of the will as an entirety and in view of all the facts and circums-
tances under which the provisions of the will were framed’”) (quoting Matter of Bieley, 695 N.E.2d 
1119 (N.Y. 1998)). 
 115. Id. at 515, 517. 
 116. Id. at 517. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See In re Estate of Schunk, No. 2008AP614, 768 N.W.2d 62, 2009 WL 703098 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 19, 2009) (per curiam unpublished table decision).  In Schunk, for example, the testator, a 
father of seven, left the bulk of his property to his youngest daughter, Megan.  Id. at *1.  The will 
specifically stated that three of the testator’s children were omitted “not through oversight” but were 
“intentionally not included . . . as beneficiaries herein.”  Id.  The three children who were not specif-
ically excluded received five-thousand dollar bequests, and Megan received the balance of the prop-
erty.  Id.  Because she was only eleven when the will was signed, however, the estate-planning attor-
ney recommended including in the will a testamentary trust so that the property could be managed 
for Megan until she reached her majority.  Id.  Unfortunately, the language of the testamentary trust 
was problematical because its purpose was stated as providing “for the expenses of raising my child-
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vides a vivid demonstration of the value such expressive language might 
contribute. 
Even if a testator or drafter is reluctant to include overarching 
statements of narrative, explanation, or purpose in a will, the testator can 
make the language of her will more expressive simply by providing de-
scriptive details about the property that the will is conveying or the 
people who are to receive it.119  Consider the difference between a will 
that disinherits a child in favor of “my friend” and a will that disinherits a 
child in favor of my friend “who has faithfully served my wife and me 
during extended illnesses for many years.”120  Similarly, a bequest of 
“my diamond ring to my daughter” is quite different from a bequest of 
“my grandmother’s diamond ring to my daughter who shares my grand-
mother’s name.”  Although this more detailed language is technically 
unnecessary, it helps transform an otherwise dry and formulaic document 
into a more fluent expression of the speaker’s personal story and thus her 
intent. 
Deviating from formula, even if the modifications are subtle or 
minute, can be a tremendously powerful means of communication.  As 
poet Kevin Young has described, there is excruciating eloquence to 
death’s most practical details: “In my own grief it was and is the smallest 
kindnesses that still stick with me: the man who gave me my father’s dry 
cleaning for free . . . the dry cleaning I’d had to drive all over town look-
ing for, using old tags found on other of his still-plastic-wrapped 
clothes . . . .”121  Young wonders why he kept his father’s “crummy plaid 
shirts and [gave] his good suits away” and recognizes that death makes 
“material things matter at once less and more”; “ritual, both inherited and 
                                                                                                                                     
ren” rather than “child” or “Megan.”  Id.  Arguing that the reference to “children” created an ambi-
guity, all six disadvantaged offspring challenged the will.  Id.  The trial court agreed that the will 
was ambiguous but allowed testimony from the drafting lawyer who explained “that the reference to 
‘children’ in the family trust portion of the will was standard form, or ‘boiler plate,’ language 
that . . . was never corrected to reflect Schunk’s actual intent.”  Id.  Based on this testimony, the trial 
court awarded the property to Megan.  Id.  The appellate court reversed, finding that, notwithstand-
ing the specific disinheritance language as to three of the children, the document was ambiguous on 
its face because of the word “children.”  Id. at *2.  The court remanded but simply for the purposes 
of seeing whether all seven children (Megan and her siblings) were entitled to benefit from the trust 
or only the four not specifically omitted.  Id.  The problems caused by improper use of boilerplate 
language in this will could not be corrected by the specific explanatory language that appeared else-
where. 
 119. See Sneddon, supra note 29, at 46–53 (identifying five categories in which a will’s author 
(the attorney on behalf of the testator) has the opportunity to inject the testator’s voice into the will 
without disturbing the will’s substantive validity, including the order of provisions in a will, delibe-
rate self-referencing, including explanations, describing people and entities, and describing proper-
ty). 
 120. See In re Will of Carter, 948 So. 2d 455, 456 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). 
 121. Kevin Young, Introduction, in THE ART OF LOSING, supra note 1, at xix. 
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invented, rush[es] in.”122 The artistic recognition that it is equally as 
poignant to wonder when “‘hair will become interesting’” as when life 
will become interesting,123 is a phenomenon mirrored in will contests, 
which just as frequently involve disputes over cattle124 or family heir-
looms125 as they do over multi-million dollar legacies.  Who receives 
great-grandmother’s pewter knife, its handle worn down by generations 
of ancestral grips, its blade dulled by decades of holiday meals, may be 
as important to testator and recipient as who receives a valuable securi-
ties account.  The more willing a testator is to express her personal vision 
or describe with particularity a beneficiary, an item of property, or the 
reason for distributing property in a particular manner, the better the tes-
tator will communicate with her audiences. 
C.  Expressive Writing as a Tool for the Drafting Lawyer 
Expressive, descriptive writing has the potential to help an author 
formulate intent and to convey that intent to her readers.  Wills are 
unique among writings because, for the most part, they have two au-
thors—the second being the scrivener (the lawyer)126 who must, in effect, 
translate the words of the only author whose intent matters (the testa-
                                                            
 122. Id.  Likewise, Joan Didion has described the most painful aspect of her husband John’s 
death as the repeated reminder that, as she turned to share the prosaic minutiae of her day, her be-
loved was no longer present to hear them.  JOAN DIDION, THE YEAR OF MAGICAL THINKING 193–96 
(2006). 
 123. Young, supra note 1, at xix (quoting Galway Kinnell, Wait, in THE ART OF LOSING, at 
250). 
 124. See, e.g., In re Estate of Peterson, 439 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Neb. 1989) (will contest by three 
of testator’s five sons claiming that undue influence by favored son caused testator to leave him 
cattle and household goods). 
 125. See Joseph M. Scheuner & Olen M. Bailey Jr., A Legal and Practical Guide to the Dispo-
sition of Tangible Personal Property at Death, ABA PROB. & PROP., May/June 2006, at 66, (2006) 
(“Tangible personal property [items] . . . have histories, stories, mythical values, family connections, 
and emotional attachments” which if unaddressed cause “feelings [to] become hurt, siblings [to] 
become rivals, and families [to] become divided.  Like the Hatfields and the McCoys, the resulting 
divisiveness—over a gold-filled ring, a tattered purse, or the family Bible—can last a lifetime.”). 
 126. See Chafee, supra note 8, at 394–95 (“[A] lawyer who is drafting an important docu-
ment . . . searches for words to fit objects.  He must probe his client’s mind to ascertain his wishes 
for all the contingencies that are likely to occur, and then do his best to put into the document a 
phrase which describes the persons or things the client desires—every one of them and no more.  
Furthermore, the lawyer must be sure that when the document later gets before the court, the judge 
will reverse the lawyer’s process and go back from the phrase to those very persons and things.  
Thus the lawyers who wrote wills or contracts and the judges who interpreted them have acted under 
a very heavy responsibility.”); Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 549–50 (“Although lawyers and their 
staffs write many wills, and people often may not understand complex provision in their own wills, 
still a lawyer’s main job is to carry out the aims of a testator as completely as possible, not to intrude 
her own views about who should receive property.”); Sneddon, supra note 29, at 15 (“When attor-
neys draft Wills, attorneys ‘are speaking for [their] clients . . . .’”) (quoting KEVIN D. MILLARD, 
DRAFTING WILLS, TRUSTS, AND OTHER ESTATE PLANNING DOCUMENTS: A STYLE MANUAL 13 
(2006)). 
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tor).127  An estate planning attorney’s job is to “adjust the wording of a 
form document . . . to accommodate and not conflict with the clients’ 
statements, while maintaining the legal provisions necessary for enfor-
ceability.”128 
An attachment to defined terms helps to explain lawyers’ reluctance 
to deviate from formulaic language when drafting wills.  In the 1940s, 
Harvard Professor Zachariah Chafee explored the centrality of written 
language specifically to lawyers, explaining that “[l]awyers and judges 
are highly susceptible to [the] notion of an indissoluble link between the 
word and the thing”; language and its many uses fascinate legal minds, 
Chafee recognized, because “words are the effective force in the legal 
world,” and indeed, he concluded, “[t]he communication of facts and 
thoughts seems never completely separated from the desire to make 
somebody do something or feel somehow.”129  In this endeavor, lawyers 
often search for more concise ways to convey a particular meaning, using 
what Chafee calls “technical terms.”130 
A “technical terms” or “formula” approach to written language 
makes tremendous sense in the field of law.  Drafting from forms is not 
only easier than creating documents from scratch, but it also allows law-
yers to reduce the economic costs of planning.131  That is, even where 
there is a “clearly competent testator advised by the best lawyers,” re-
quiring the testator, and more particularly the scrivener, to eschew for-
mula and strive for expressiveness threatens to generate economic costs 
that may be difficult to justify.132  The expenses associated with drafting 
                                                            
 127. With respect to intent, though, only one author matters, thereby distinguishing a will from 
other legal writing, such as a contract, statute, or constitution.  Hancher, supra note 13, at 510 (ob-
serving that wills, as compared with statutes and constitutions, make it “easier to think about a single 
author, a single testator”). 
 128. Smith, supra note 9, at 74; see also Sneddon, supra note 29, at 15–16 & 29–30 (discuss-
ing role of attorney in drafting wills to speak on behalf of testator). 
 129. Chafee, supra note 8, at 383; see also id. at 384 (“Lawyers and judges are highly suscept-
ible to this notion of an indissoluble link between the word and the thing.  A sense of the inherent 
potency of words is natural with us.  Words are the effective force in the legal world.  In statutes, 
they result in heavy fines, long imprisonment or even death.  In contracts, deeds, or wills, they trans-
fer large amounts of property.  Hence the persistent feeling in our profession that the right words 
must be used.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 82, at 61 (“Lawyers possess only one tool to convey 
their thoughts: language.  They must acquire and hone the finest, most effective version of that tool 
available.  They must love words and use them exactly.”). 
 130. Chafee, supra note 8, at 384. 
 131. See Sneddon, supra note 29, at 28–29. 
 132. See Foster, supra note 21, at 244–45 (describing the challenge of drafting as “often ac-
companied by inordinate expense as the will is revised over and over—not to provide for different 
beneficiaries but merely to acknowledge changes in family status or assets that, if not mentioned, 
could provide the basis for an attack”); Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 60, at 623 (acknowledging 
possibility of “placing the onus on testators to expound their wishes—whether present or antic-
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and redrafting documents, even if not to make substantive changes but 
simply to adapt to unanticipated events resulting from the passage of 
time, can be significant.133  The simpler and more formulaic a will is, one 
might argue, the cheaper and more accessible it will be both for lawyers 
and laymen to read and adapt.134 
Nevertheless, “estate planners must focus on the particular testa-
tor’s wishes, even if it means deviating from a form, rather than routinely 
shunting the client to a pre-drafted form” because a will, “unlike most 
other legal documents, is a representation of the individual ‘speak-
ing.’”135  As costly as it may be for the testator to add more expressive 
language to a will, the costs of litigating a will contest, whether borne by 
the litigants or the estate, are likely to be far more onerous.136  Further-
more, while drafting with an intensified level of self-consciousness and 
expressiveness adds another burden to the estate planning lawyer’s job, 
the freedom or license to depart from formula and to provide a vehicle 
and voice for a client’s last words should be a welcome relief to these 
lawyers.137  Faced with clients (testators and beneficiaries) who complain 
about fees and threaten malpractice suits,138 an approach that encourages 
lawyers to take the time to infuse a document with the client’s deliberate 
preferences, and even her history or philosophy, has the potential to give 
the testator and the objects of her bounty—those remembered and those 
omitted—a sense of closure that counteracts other frustrations they might 
                                                                                                                                     
ipated—within an executed writing” but recognizing the expense, both economic and cognitive, of 
planning for every contingency). 
 133. Foster, supra note 21, at 244; Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 60, at 623.  Changes to 
property or family may occur after a will is drafted and before death that render the will’s language 
meaningless or ambiguous.  See id. at 611; Garvey, supra note 29, at 47–48. 
 134. There are numerous websites available today where a testator can have a will drafted and 
even add her own language variations.  For some of the most popular examples, see 
LEGALZOOM.COM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2010); LEGACY WRITER, 
http://www.legacywriter.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2010); THE WILL COMPANY, 
http://www.thewillcompany.com (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
 135. See Sneddon, supra note 29, at 29. 
 136. See Halbach, supra note 23, at 1452, 1456–57 (stressing the imperative of drafters provid-
ing answers to questions in documents because ultimately “[c]ostly litigation produces only a guess 
as to what the [decedent] would have intended if the precise question in issue had been presented”). 
 137. See Weisberg, supra note 33, at 135 (“Each prospective client crossing the lawyer’s thre-
shold presents a kind of ‘first narrative’ to the professional listener. . . .  The act of ‘representation’ 
(a word that means both the way something is portrayed and the lawyer’s decision to take on a 
client’s case!) inevitably involves the translation of the original narrative into a series of professio-
nally crafted writings.  In these, be they last wills and testaments, contracts, pleadings, or memoran-
da, the lawyer must structure the matter from a narrative perspective suitable to the audience and 
faithful to the client’s wishes as now rewritten, renarrativized.”). 
 138. See Beyer, Blue Screen, supra note 56, at 64–96 (describing potential for malpractice 
actions arising in estate planning context and common errors in client counseling, drafting, and 
overseeing execution of wills that might lead to such actions); see also Sneddon, supra note 29, at 
34–36 (discussing evolution of malpractice actions in wills context). 
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feel about costs, delays, or administrative burdens.139  In addition, if a 
will ends up in litigation, a jury may be more receptive to the intent of a 
testator when her goals are expressed clearly and in her individual 
voice.140  As the case survey discussed in Part IV suggests, expressive 
language may help facilitate a court’s analysis of a challenged instrument 
and also may dissuade will contests in the first place.141 
D. Expressive Writing as a Tool for the Grieving 
Although the authors of wills (testator and scrivener) may benefit 
from an approach that discourages use of purely formulaic language in 
wills in favor of more expressive drafting, those most likely to benefit 
from this suggested change are the different readers, including the bene-
ficiaries, fiduciaries, and possibly the court.  Along with facilitating the 
testator’s ability to formulate her intent in the first instance and then fos-
tering her ability to convey that intent on her own or with her lawyer’s 
help, expressive writing also has the potential to bring the testator’s 
loved ones together in a moment of loss.  Consider, for example, the eth-
ical will142 of Rose Weiss Baygel, who immigrated to Cleveland from 
                                                            
 139. Smith, supra note 9, at 73–75.  Ironically, a more expressive approach to will drafting also 
might increase estate planning business for lawyers by convincing individuals to seek advice and 
counsel rather than preparing wills on their own.  Many individuals today avoid hiring lawyers to 
prepare their wills based in part on a belief that form books produce documents that are as useful as, 
if not identical to, any document produced by a trained lawyer.  Grant, supra note 77, at 136 (“Over 
the past twenty to twenty-five years, we have seen a proliferation of pre-prepared will forms that are 
readily available to consumers in this country. . . .  Individuals turn to these other sources for a num-
ber of reasons.  Many are disillusioned or mistrust attorneys.  Some individuals feel like they know 
just as much as a trained and licensed attorney.  In many communities, attorneys have priced them-
selves out of the market for average consumers.  Some individuals want the highest level of privacy 
when it comes to their personal lives.  Some individuals are forced to deal with death and mortality 
in ways they do not want to in preparing their wills.  Some clients feel that attorneys overly and 
unnecessarily complicate basic but important aspects of will preparation.”); see also Clowney, supra 
note 76, at 35–38 (describing arguments for and against allowing holographic wills).  For a compre-
hensive list of available internet websites and portals available for consumers to create a will without 
the assistance of an attorney, see Grant, supra note 77, at 136 n.137.  For a discussion of statutory 
fill-in-the-blank will forms, see Beyer, supra note 72, at 769.  If we accept that wills should be more 
than fill-in-the-blank forms, a testator might feel better about seeking help from a lawyer to craft a 
will that adequately expresses the testator’s desires.  And if choosing to draft a homemade will is the 
appropriate decision for a testator, see Clowney, supra, at 76, this expressive approach might help 
clarify the meaning of such homemade wills, which often become the subject of challenge.  But see 
Chafee, supra note 8, at 395 (“‘The jolly testatrix who makes her own will’ supplies remunerative 
semantic investigations for the bar.”). 
 140. Baron, Empathy, supra note 50, at 1076 (discussing how juries accept testators’ views and 
act with empathy, so that the clearer such views are expressed, the easier it becomes to trigger jury 
empathy). 
 141. See infra text accompanying notes 172–77. 
 142. Ethical wills, defined as “legacies of intangibles” or “statements intended to pass along 
values and beliefs to succeeding generations,” stem back to the ancient world.  Zoe M. Hicks, Is 
Your (Ethical) Will in Order, 33 ACTEC J. 154, 154 (2007); James Edward Harris, Level Five Phi-
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Riga, Latvia, when she was young, worked in a sweatshop as a teen, and 
married and raised three children with her husband who predeceased 
her.143  Her last written words to her children admonished them to “be to 
one another—good sisters and brother. . . .  Be good to each other.”144  
As the author of a book about the value of ethical wills explains, children 
who get a last request like this one “are not likely to end up fighting with 
each other in court.”145 
Like ethical wills, traditional wills too might aid the grieving by 
explicitly describing the testator’s preferences and delineating the rea-
sons for any unusual dispositions.146  This type of explanation might help 
“dissuad[e] a child receiving a lesser share from concluding that such 
treatment resulted from the influence of a favored child” and might help 
avoid[] the angst of children having to speculate on the parental ra-
tionale or coming to the wrong conclusion for such disparate treat-
ment, e.g., that their parents had less affection for them as opposed 
to a parental desire to reward a sibling for care or services provided 
to them either personally or in a business endeavor.147 
Including the testator’s preferences, personal history, or vision for 
the future might also help address in part the problem of “testamentary 
obsolescence” that results from the passage of time.148  One practitioner 
describes a purpose provision that he includes in all the instruments he 
prepares as “summarizing the primary goals of the estate plan from the 
purview of the client, including, for example, preserving family harmo-
ny, minimizing taxation, reducing administrative costs, and protecting 
assets from claims by third parties through the use of lifetime trusts for 
                                                                                                                                     
lanthropy: Designing a Plan for Strategic, Effective, Efficient Giving, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 19, 22 (2003).  For a comprehensive book describing and encouraging the use of ethical wills, 
see BARRY K. BAINES, M.D., ETHICAL WILLS: PUTTING YOUR VALUES ON PAPER (2d ed. 2006). 
 143. SO THAT YOUR VALUES LIVE ON—ETHICAL WILLS AND HOW TO PREPARE THEM xxiv–
xxv (Jack Riemer & Nathaniel Stampfer eds., 2009). 
 144. Id. at xxv. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See O’Sullivan, supra note 62, at 308–10; see also Hicks, supra note 142, at 162 (“Many 
ethical wills are woven into traditional wills as we have seen, for example, in the traditional wills of 
George Washington, Patrick Henry, and John Jay.  This may be particularly true with charitable 
bequests as the testator or testatrix provides thinking behind the bequest or goals with respect to the 
bequest to the desired charitable organization.  So called ‘incentive trust documents’ also include 
types of provisions that could be considered part of ethical wills because they set forth values of the 
trustor and indicate to the children what type of behavior is expected and will be rewarded.”). 
 147. O’Sullivan, supra note 62, at 308–09. 
 148. See Halbach, supra note 23, at 1427, 1433 (“Although all possible questions can not be 
anticipated, every effort should be made to give the [fiduciary] sufficient guidance as to what” was 
intended, including “illustration” or “suggestion”); Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 60, at 623 
(describing problem of “testamentary obsolescence”). 
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family members.”149  Even if this language is purely precatory,150 it ex-
presses the testator’s philosophy and might prove helpful to the read-
ers—court, beneficiaries, other mourners, fiduciaries—in understanding, 
accepting, and carrying out the testator’s intent.151 
Indeed, the audience most likely to welcome a more expressive ap-
proach to wills consists of the fiduciaries, such as executors and trustees, 
who essentially stand in the testator’s shoes and act as the testator’s sur-
rogates with respect to distribution and ongoing administration of estate 
property.152  While a more expressive testamentary document may im-
pose added restrictions on these fiduciaries, it can also provide them with 
crucial guidance in moments of uncertainty.153 
In this respect, it is important to acknowledge that giving a testator 
a more expansive platform for expression potentially provides a greater 
opportunity for the testator to engage in vain and irresponsible “post-
humous meddling.”154  While a property owner might imagine she knows 
the best and most fruitful disposition for her property, her attempt to con-
trol her loved ones’ lives and futures, even if well intended, may be 
counterproductive when it actually takes effect.155  Moreover, even when 
                                                            
 149. O’Sullivan, supra note 62, at 320.  Professor Greenawalt recognizes that interpretation 
itself would be facilitated if a court were able to “develop a clear sense of the objectives of the writ-
er.”  Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 570. 
 150. See supra notes 64 & 79. 
 151. See Smith, supra note 9, at 74.  Although none of the cases examined in Part IV contained 
this type of language, one might argue that the absence indicates that where statements of values are 
included, these wills are respected or at least not litigated.  See infra text accompanying notes 178–
79.  On an interesting note, one scholar has observed the gendered implications of precatory lan-
guage, see DiRusso, supra note 79, although another has observed that left to their own devices, a 
testator’s gender does not appear to affect use of expressive language, Daphna Hacker, The Gen-
dered Dimensions of Inheritance: Empirical Food for Legal Thought, J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
at 16–17 (forthcoming 2010) (on file with author) (reviewing twenty-three empirical studies on 
inheritance from around the world and calling for further studies to test whether women feel “con-
strained by their spouses and by professionals involved in the will-making process from using their 
wills to acknowledge their broader network of relationships, to address specific items they own, and 
to express personal and sentimental thoughts and feelings”). 
 152. See SHAFFER ET AL., DRAFTING WILLS, supra note 23, at 177 (“Many of our documents 
in the property settlement practice have offices far beyond disposition.  They are charters for human 
conduct which must or should be used routinely by lay fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and parties to con-
tracts.”). 
 153. See Halbach, supra note 23, at 1433–34 (discussing the problem of lack of guidance in the 
context of fiduciary powers in trusts); Pruett, supra note 31, at 341–47 (providing drafting sugges-
tions from fiduciary perspective). 
 154. See Sherman, supra note 26, at 1283–84. 
 155. Id. (“The tendency of some testators to make rigid dispositions is often an aspect of an 
understandable type of vanity.  T has been successful in business and this money is the measure of 
and witness to his success.  He has been a good father and has always known what was best for his 
family.  Who should know better than he how to invest and dispose of this money after his death?  
The only answer is: Time marches on.  Thoughtless, playful children grow into serious-minded 
resourceful adults.  Healthy, prosperous adults suffer illness, failure and the other casualties of life.  
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the will does not impose lasting conditions on the beneficiaries or fidu-
ciaries, expressions by the testator may be just as likely to cause friction 
and divisiveness as to convey meaning and foster harmony.  In a 1932 
essay entitled The Whimsies of Will Makers, lawyer and humorist Harry 
Hibschman recounts will after will that contains unique and quite expres-
sive language, much of which appears designed to control or toy with the 
testator’s beneficiaries.156  Ranging from cruel to pathetic to humorous, 
the wills Hibschman cites show that these words have the potential to be 
as cutting as they are kind, imposing the testators’ idiosyncratic desires 
on the people they have left behind.157  Such negative expressions may 
be “the last memory the [loved one] has of the [deceased], which if not 
resulting in an enduring resentment not previously present, will create a 
permanent feeling of rejection that could exact a costly emotional 
toll.”158  This type of language also may raise issues of testamentary li-
bel,159 although such claims appear to carry little contemporary force.160 
Recognizing these potential costs of expressive language should be 
more cautionary than prohibitive, though, and should help moderate and 
guide those testators who accept the potentially significant benefits of 
enhancing an ordinary, standard will with their own personal narratives 
and expressive language.  As the following case studies vividly demon-
strate, careful and deliberate inclusion of expressive “last words” can 
facilitate the communication of intent without causing disarray. 
                                                                                                                                     
The gilt-edge bonds of today are the cats-and-dogs of tomorrow. . . .  Making a will is an exercise of 
power without responsibility.  Free of the constraint of what the neighbours would think; free, above 
all, of the constraint of requiring houses and assets for their own use, testators can sometimes be so 
awed by the infinite wisdom of their own plans for the future as to feel justified in controlling other 
people’s lives—for their own good, naturally.”). 
 156. See Harry Hibschman, Whimsies of Will-Makers, 66 U.S. L. REV. 362, 362 (1932). 
 157. See id. (“[A] will is a man’s one sure chance to have the last word.  In it he can vent his 
spite in safety without his victims’ having a chance to answer back.”); Horton, supra note 20, at 
1704 (suggesting that “a testamentary instrument . . . raises the specter of moral hazard” because the 
property owner is exercising “power without responsibility”); Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 570 
(observing that testators are free “to be arbitrary or capricious”); Sherman, supra note 26, at 1276 
(“[T]estamentary conditions proceed more often from spite than from benevolence and result not in 
connubial rejoicing but in enduring bitterness.”). 
 158. O’Sullivan, supra note 62, at 309–10. 
 159. DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 198.  See generally Paul T. Whitcombe, 
Defamation by Will: Theories and Liabilities, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 749 (1994) (discussing fun-
damentals of action for testamentary libel and proposing alternative uniform approach). 
 160. Dawn Allison, Note, The Importance of Estate Planning within the Gay and Lesbian 
Community, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 445, 472–73 (1998) (observing decline of testamentary libel 
suits). 
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IV.  READING CASES ABOUT WILLS: 
DOES EXPRESSIVE LANGUAGE HELP OR HINDER? 
The discussion to this point has focused on the potential social, rhe-
torical, and functional benefits and costs of incorporating expressive lan-
guage in wills.  This Part focuses on the legal ramifications of expressive 
language by looking at the language of wills in a defined universe of in-
heritance case law.161  More specifically, this Part considers the existence 
and effect of expressive language in wills that are challenged on the 
grounds of undue influence or, in other words, for being something other 
than a true expression of the testator’s intent.162  Although undue influ-
ence cases do not specifically present situations where will language is 
potentially ambiguous or controversial, the cases provide a fertile data-
base for exploring expressive language because the testators in these cas-
es are aware that their respective wills diverged from expectation or, in 
other words, did something other than default rules would dictate. 
First, this Part provides some general background on undue influ-
ence law.  Second, it analyzes a representative sample of those cases to 
show how expressive language can aid in explaining the testator’s intent.  
Third, it acknowledges that expressive language cannot solve all prob-
lems of interpretation, particularly in the situation where the testator is 
unable to adequately form or express intent.  Finally, it argues that ex-
pressive language is most useful when it is incorporated directly into the 
will, rather than being relegated to nonbinding side letters. 
A.  Why Undue Influence Cases Promise to Illustrate 
Expressive Will Language 
Undue influence cases provide a unique snapshot of wills doctrine 
across the country due primarily to their sheer number.163  Undue influ-
                                                            
 161. But see infra notes 172 & 177 (discussing further areas of inquiry). 
 162. All testators, like all individuals generally, are influenced in action and thought by those 
around them and, most powerfully, by those whom they love and admire.  Influence that the law 
deems “undue” enough to invalidate a will, however, must “overwhelm” or “overpower” the testa-
tor’s autonomy, to “destroy[] the free choice of the person making the will,” so that the influencer’s 
intent is substituted for the testator’s own.  Allee v. Ruby Scott Sigears Estate, 182 S.W.3d 772, 780 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Leslie, supra note 47, at 244; Madoff, supra note 47, at 575; see also O’Neall 
v. Farr, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 80, 83–84 (1844) (describing disposition that disinherited wife in favor 
of mistress as “an act all would condemn, and concur in denouncing as immoral and improper the 
influence which produced it; yet, if it be done under the influence of affection merely, however 
unworthy the object may be, such wills have been, and must be, supported, so long as the law allows 
a sane man to dispose of his property according to his own wishes”) (quoted and discussed in Blu-
menthal, supra note 87, at 999). 
 163. Leslie, supra note 47, at 243 (noting “the large number of undue influence cases litigated 
each year”).  More than mere number, though, undue influence cases are occupied by characters who 
exhibit the raging drama of family life: an endless litany of jealousy; love; resentment; self-
preservation; favoritism; selfishness; and suspicion.  The Jerry Springer Shows of the law, these 
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ence claims are the “most frequent ground for invalidating a will”164 and 
usually involve a testator who becomes particularly susceptible because 
of age, illness, poverty, loneliness, or some combination thereof.165  The 
testator’s autonomy is compromised by one or more individuals who are 
close to the testator and frequently essential to her survival.166  The cases 
tell two vastly conflicting stories: the first, that of a singular friend or 
relative who helps an elderly or infirm testator and benefits from the tes-
tator’s gratitude and therefore bounty; and the second, recounted by the 
family members or friends who are on the losing end of the gift, of an 
overreaching opportunist who helps the weakened testator not because 
she is generous but rather because she is mercenary. 
Although these cases do not specifically involve interpretation of 
ambiguous language, the cases provide a perfect opportunity for a testa-
tor to address directly the underlying human interactions and emotions 
that led to what the outside world—court, beneficiaries, fiduciaries—
might view as an “unnatural” (meaning either unequal or unpredictable) 
disposition.167  In other words, regardless of an observer’s normative 
                                                                                                                                     
cases present a dramatic stage on which to test various theories, such as the perpetuation of norma-
tive values and gender inequities, among others.  See, e.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary 
Gifts Resulting from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200, 202 (1989) (arguing that “meretricious relationships” should constitute 
evidence that recipient is natural object of testator’s bounty rather than potentially wrongful in-
fluencer); Leslie, supra note 47, at 243–58 (arguing that courts impose their own moral values rather 
than honor testamentary intent); Madoff, supra note 47, at 576 (contending that “the undue influence 
doctrine denies freedom of testation for people who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary 
norms”); Brian Alan Ross, Undue Influence and Gender Inequity, 19 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 97, 100 
(1997) (arguing that courts apply undue influence doctrine to “preserve[] a male-oriented status quo 
by effectively punishing women who stray from traditional gender roles and expectations”). 
 164. Madoff, supra note 47, at 574 (“[U]ndue influence doctrine is the most frequent ground 
for invalidating a will. . . .  [F]or every reported case there are many more cases that settle before 
trial or even before the filing of a suit.”). 
 165. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 180–207 (compiling materials and 
describing warning signs for undue influence cases). 
 166. See, e.g., Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W.3d 901 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006); Sandford v. Met-
calfe, 954 A.2d 188 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008); Conrad v. Gamble, 962 A.2d 1007 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2008); In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So. 2d 674 (Miss. 2007); Monroe v. Marsden, 207 P.3d 320 
(Mont. 2009). 
 167. See, e.g., Germain v. Girard, 892 N.E.2d 754, 758 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (reversing 
judgment approving will and remanding case for fact finding on undue influence by son-in-law who 
“enjoyed [decedent’s] trust and confidence because no explanation appeared in trust explaining why 
imposition of a trust, vesting sole discretion in [daughter] over distributions, was necessary or ap-
propriate to achieve [decedent’s] stated objectives, in contrast to the terms of his 1983 will (which 
devised his entire estate to [his wife] outright)”); In re Estate of Hall, 32 So.3d 506, 518 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2009), cert. denied 31 So.3d 1217 (Miss. 2010) (Testator, a river boat engineer who became ill 
with lung cancer, relocated to a home on the property of a long-time friend; after months of care 
from friend and family, testator executed will leaving property to friend without saying why friend 
was preferred over sister; although appellate court affirmed trial court’s finding of no undue influ-
ence, court warned it “may well have reached a different conclusion from that of the chancellor if it 
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view of the estate plans in these cases, the dispositions do something 
other than what default rules would support, either by omitting a blood 
relative in favor of some other person or entity or preferring one blood 
relative over another who would have equal claim based solely on con-
sanguinity rules in the jurisdiction.  Expressive, unique, and individua-
lized language has the ability to explain the reasons behind the unex-
pected dispositions.168 
In fact, some of the most notorious undue influence cases that cur-
rently appear in leading casebooks and scholarly works contain memora-
ble and vivid language and personal narratives that explain the will pro-
visions.169  From an empirical survey of undue influence cases, then, a 
reader would expect these testators to be more likely than others to use 
expressive language because these testators are well aware of the possi-
bility that the omitted or short-changed heirs will pursue a will contest.170 
                                                                                                                                     
were considering the case in the first instance.”); In re Will of Turner, No. COA08-1564, 687 S.E.2d 
319, 2009 WL 2780009 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2009) (unpublished) (invalidating codicil that did not 
explain why testator excluded prior charitable beneficiary and instead left estate to friend who, dur-
ing the nineteen years they knew each other, cared for testator and helped operate business when 
testator became disabled). 
 168. See Smith, supra note 9, at 76 (“By permitting, and even encouraging, a client to express 
personal values or positive motivation behind a legal disposition of assets, an attorney can minimize 
the beneficiaries’ basis for a claim of undue influence.”). 
 169. See DUKEMINIER ET AL, WILLS, supra note 21, at 194–98 (The source demonstrates undue 
influence law with Lipper v. Weslow, 369 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Tex. App. 1963), where testator ex-
plained her property distribution by stating, in relevant part,  “My son, [Julian] died on August 6, 
1949, and I want to explain why I have not provided anything under this will for my daughter-in-
law, [Bernice], widow of my deceased son, Julian, and her children . . . , and I want to go into suffi-
cient detail in explaining my relationship in past years with my said son’s widow and his children, 
before mentioned, and it is my desire to record such relationship so that there will be no question as 
to my feelings in the matter or any thought or suggestion that my children . . . or my husband, Max, 
may have influenced me in any manner in the execution of this will.”); WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY 
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 13, at 4-65 to 4-66 (The source demonstrates undue influence law with 
the case of Ramsey v. Taylor, 999 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Or. Ct. App. 2000), petition for review denied, 
18 P.3d 1099 (Or. 2000), in which testator’s will contained the following explanation: “I have inten-
tionally provided significant, yet smaller amounts for my son and grandsons because they have for 
several years alienated my affections by being irresponsible, contentious, and constantly seeking 
financial support from me rather than providing for themselves.  I have made provisions for 
MELODY J. TAYLOR . . . [who] provides me care and support.  In providing for [my mistress] 
instead of my sons and grandsons, I am recognizing her for providing for my needs.”); see also 
Blumenthal, supra note 87, at 986–89 (discussing Heirs at Law of Lee v. Ex’r of Lee, 15 S.C.L. (4 
McCord) 183, 184 (1827), where testator’s will bequeathed the whole of his $50,000 estate to the 
states of South Carolina and Tennessee and disinherited the testator’s nieces, nephews, and illegiti-
mate sons, explaining his “will and desire that no part or parcel of my estate shall be enjoyed, or in 
any wise inherited by either or any of my relations, while wood grows or water runs”). 
 170. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 203–05 (proposing strategies for 
avoiding will contest when warning signs, such as an unnatural disposition, are present); Fajer, supra 
note 68, at 578 (“[B]lood relations will often try to break the will of a deceased member of a gay 
relationship, sometimes alleging undue influence or lack of capacity, thus insulting the memory of 
the deceased.”). 
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B. Analyzing the Cases  
In a search that turned up approximately 180171 cases from the past 
five years,172 twelve cases referred to language in the challenged testa-
mentary instruments that could be characterized as expressive because it 
was explanatory, individualized, or departed from formula.173  Although 
sixteen additional cases either cited, quoted, or discussed written lan-
guage relating to the property disposition in question, the language in 
those cases did not meet this Article’s definition of expressive-wills lan-
guage because the cited language was either a standard provision, such as 
a forfeiture, or revocation clause,174 or it appeared somewhere other than 
in the will, such as in Post-It notes or side letters.175  Although the testa-
                                                            
 171. In fact, the search resulted in 181 cases, see infra APPENDIX A, but one was the lower 
court decision of a case that was reversed on appeal.  See Chapman v. Varela, 191 P.3d 567 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 213 P.3d 1109 (N.M. 2009). 
 172. The search examined each case noted in the Westlaw topic number 409 (Wills), key num-
bers 154–66 (covering the elements of undue influence and related evidentiary and procedural is-
sues) for the period between December 31, 2004, and January 1, 2010.  For a complete list of cases, 
see APPENDIX A.  This search is identical to the one run by Professor Leslie in her seminal article, 
see supra Leslie, note 47, although the search in this Article looked at cases from a more recent time 
period. 
 173. Pirtle v. Tucker, 960 So. 2d 620, 624 (Ala. 2006); Sloan v. Segal, No. 2319-VCS, 2009 
WL 1204494, *7, *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2009); Kersey v. Williamson, 670 S.E.2d 405, 406 (Ga. 
2008); Rothwell v. Singleton, 257 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Graham v. Fulkerson, 187 
S.W.3d 324, 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005); In re Succession of Hollis, 987 So. 2d 387, 392 (La. Ct. App. 
2008); In re Succession of Culotta, 900 So. 2d 137, 138 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Conrad v. Gamble, 962 
A.2d 1007, 1011 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Allee v. Ruby Scott Sigears Estate, 182 S.W.3d 772, 
776 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); In re Will of Carter, 948 So. 2d 455, 456 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007); Chapman 
v. Varela, 213 P.3d 1109, 1109 (N.M. 2009); In re Will of Ryan, 824 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (App. Div. 
2006). 
 174. See In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 687 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding testator’s 
statement in will to “give the balance of my assets to a charitable foundation or trust” manifested 
sufficient charitable testamentary intent); Lillard v. Owens, 641 S.E.2d 511, 512 (Ga. 2007) (forfei-
ture clause); In re Succession of Deshotel, 10 So. 3d 873, 877 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (citing introducto-
ry clause revoking prior will); In re Will of Kistler, 22 So. 3d 1209, 1211–12 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) 
(citing forfeiture clause); In re Estate of Greenwald, 849 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (App. Div. 2008) (for-
feiture clause); In re Estate of Pringle, 751 N.W.2d 277, 282 (S.D. 2008) (The court found no undue 
influence when the will “expressly set out [Testator’s] intent to have joint tenancy property pass 
outside the will [to her son Ron] with the remainder of her estate to [pass to her three children equal-
ly].”); In re Estate of Henry, 250 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tex. App. 2008) (quoting formulaic survivorship 
language in will); cf. In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So. 2d 674, 678–79 (Miss. 2007) (describing be-
quests in multiple wills, the latest of which contained forfeiture clause that court found to be moot 
because will deemed invalid based on undue influence). 
 175. See Medlock v. Mitchell, 234 S.W.3d 901, 903 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (citing revocable 
trust containing forfeiture clause and specific exclusion of adopted children); In re Estate of Wilt-
fong, 148 P.3d 465, 466 (Colo. App. 2006) (discussing letter submitted to probate as will); In re 
Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d 672, 678 (D.C. 2008) (referring to handwritten notes); Patterson v. Patter-
son, No. 17-04-07, 2005 WL 1074809, *1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 9, 2005) (remarking on original but 
revoked wills that devised farm to youngest son, divided remainder between two other sons and 
specifically excluded fourth son “because he had already been provided for by virtue of his remaind-
er interest in the other farm”); Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843, 846–47 (R.I. 2005) (side letter of 
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tors in the remaining 152 cases chose to make testamentary dispositions 
that departed from expectation—or at least from what default rules 
would dictate—the cases did not produce the anticipated examples of 
expressive language. 
Although one might posit various reasons why these courts did not 
discuss the words of the wills challenged in these cases, one explanation 
for such omission is that nothing in the language of the wills attracted the 
attention of the respective courts.176  In other words, the overwhelming 
majority of wills across the country that were challenged on undue influ-
ence grounds during this five-year period must have used language that 
was entirely ordinary and unworthy of note.  Standing alone, this obser-
vation is interesting because, recognizing that direct evidence of undue 
influence is rare and elusive, courts look for ways to sift through, unra-
vel, and evaluate what are often equally credible narratives.177  A consis-
tent element of the inquiry is whether “suspicious circumstances” ex-
ist,178 and the language of the testamentary instrument provides one way 
to overcome evidence of such circumstances.179  If a court makes no 
mention of a will’s language as part of its analysis, it is likely that the 
will does not contain any unique or helpful language.  This observation 
                                                                                                                                     
explanation not admitted into evidence); In re Estate of Schisler, 316 S.W.3d 599, 603 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 2009) (early version of revocable trust explained that one of six children “had already received 
‘machinery and other assets’ that represented his share of the family farm” but no such distinctions 
or explanations in any of the wills); Parish v. Kemp, 179 S.W.3d 524, 527–28 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing formulaic language from payable-on-death account forms and durable powers of attorney); In 
re Estate of Russell, 311 S.W.3d 528, 533–34 (Tex. App. 2009) (Post-It notes related to giving din-
ing room table to grandson). 
 176. Another explanation might be that courts in some cases are choosing not to cite to expres-
sive language because it does not serve the result the court is seeking to implement.  Examining the 
180 wills at issue in these cases to determine what type of language the testators actually used and 
the courts decided not to include is an area for further study. 
 177. Leslie, supra note 47, at n.47; Madoff, supra note 47, at 582–83. 
 178. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 
cmt. h.  Where a relationship is deemed “confidential” and “suspicious circumstances” arise, a court 
will presume that the will has been improperly influenced and place some form of evidentiary bur-
den on the fiduciary or confidant to show that the will was the product of the testator’s desire and not 
the beneficiary’s.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 184–85. 
 179. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 198 (observing court’s reliance on 
testator’s recital of reasons for disposition).  Consider, for example, one subset of undue influence 
cases involving a family business or farm that the testator leaves to the person who has helped oper-
ate the property, to the exclusion of other relatives with technically equal or superior claim.  See, 
e.g., Patterson, 2005 WL 1074809 at *1; Bajakian, 880 A.2d at 845–47; Pringle, 751 N.W.2d at 
282.  In this type of case, courts often consider witness testimony concerning the testator’s desire to 
preserve her legacy by preventing the property from being sold.  See infra note 207.  There are many 
practical approaches to dealing with this preference by the testator, see O’Sullivan, supra note 62, at 
291–94 (suggesting drafting options, such as buy–sell arrangements, insurance provisions, and vot-
ing shares, for testator who is transitioning family-owned business and wants to facilitate rather than 
disrupt family harmony), one of which would be including language that explains the reason for the 
distribution.  Id. at 320. 
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also leads to a second but related inference about wills containing more 
expressive or explanatory language.  Numerous wills are admitted to 
probate each year without challenge.180  To the extent that wills contain-
ing more expressive, individualized language exist, then, these wills may 
be less likely to result in a formal contest, at least on the grounds of un-
due influence, than wills with standard formulaic language.181 
Support for the observation that expressive language can prove 
beneficial is found in the few cases from the five-year survey that discuss 
wills that diverge from formula and contain some form of unique lan-
guage.  When the wills incorporated even very simple expressions about 
the dispositive plan that went beyond the actual disposition—for exam-
ple, the reason for disinheritance or for preferring one relative over 
another—those wills were generally upheld, regardless of whether a jury 
or judge decided the case.  In Graham v. Fulkerson, for example, the el-
derly testator’s three estranged daughters challenged a will that be-
queathed them token gifts and gave the remainder of the decedent’s es-
tate to his only son.182  The will contained language explaining “I make 
this bequest because my son is the only child who has cared for me in my 
old age.”183  The jury found that the son had not exerted undue influence 
over the testator, and the daughters appealed.  Notwithstanding a residu-
ary clause that contained several errors, the appellate court agreed that 
the will was unambiguous on its face and “clearly disposed” of the elder-
ly testator’s estate as he intended; the court therefore rejected the daugh-
ters’ challenge.184 
The New York case In re Will of Ryan, involving the will of a nine-
ty-two-year-old mother of eight, likewise supports the conclusion that 
expressive language can help support will validity by demonstrating 
donative intent.185  The Ryan testator specifically disinherited three of her 
children, “albeit regretfully,”186 leaving the bulk of her estate to four of 
the five remaining children and the wife of her eldest son.  The will con-
tained explanatory or “extra” language noting that the disinherited sibl-
ings had initiated a proceeding in California against one of the testator’s 
other children; the testator had asked her three children to discontinue the 
California proceeding and, when they refused, had threatened them with 
                                                            
 180. Karen S. Gerstner, A Message to Clients . . . Avoiding Probate Court Litigation, ABA 
PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 56–57. 
 181. Comparing language in wills that lead to challenge against wills that are admitted to pro-
bate without contest presents another area for further study. 
 182. Graham v. Fulkerson, 187 S.W.3d 324, 326 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 328–29. 
 185. In re Will of Ryan, 824 N.Y.S.2d 20, 23 (App. Div. 2006). 
 186. Id. at 22. 
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disinheritance.187  Recognizing that the attorney who had drafted the will 
was a friend of the “favored” son, the appellate court nevertheless ob-
served that motives like “gratitude, love, esteem or friendship,” even if 
they “induce” a testator to dispose of his property in particular ways, do 
not rise to undue influence but rather “are allowed to have full scope.”188  
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the surrogate’s denial of sum-
mary judgment and dismissed the disinherited children’s undue influence 
claim.189  The expression of the testator’s reasoning that appeared in the 
will did not contribute to any misunderstanding but rather facilitated the 
court’s decision to grant summary judgment in the will proponents’ fa-
vor.190 
Based on the five-year sampling, then, where the testamentary doc-
ument told the story of why the identified heirs were or were not receiv-
ing property, even if that explanation was simple, courts respected the 
disposition.191 
                                                            
 187. Id. (“The propounded will stated that objectants knew ‘from the beginning that [decedent] 
disapproved of what they were doing’ and were warned on numerous occasions that they would be 
disinherited unless they called off the lawsuit against Tomas.”). 
 188. Id. at 23 (quoting Children’s Aid Soc’y v. Loveridge, 70 N.Y. 387, 394–95 (1877)). 
 189. Id. at 24. 
 190. Another case supporting this observation is Allee v. Ruby Scott Sigears Estate, 182 
S.W.3d 772, 774 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006), in which the testator, an eighty-one-year-old widow with four 
living children from her first marriage, executed a will that benefited her two sons and excluded her 
two daughters.  More specifically, the challenged will directed that all property, real and personal, 
was to be divided equally between the sons and explained that the testator “intentionally [made] no 
provision in [her] Last Will and Testament for [her] daughters . . . having already given large 
amounts of money to them during [her] lifetime and having been poorly treated by them.”  Id. at 
776.  After the testator’s death, her daughters presented an earlier will to probate, arguing that the 
will excluding them from inheriting had been executed when the testator lacked capacity and was 
under the improper and undue influence of her sons and their respective wives.  Id. at 775.  Soon 
after the testator executed the contested will, she was declared fully incapacitated.  Id.  At trial, the 
attorney who drafted the second will testified that although the testator’s son and his wife had driven 
testator to the meeting, the attorney met with testator alone, and it was she who requested inclusion 
of the explanatory language.  Id. at 776–77.  The trial court, which also heard testimony from the 
testator’s treating physician, neighbors, and children (including a son who was a social worker and 
specialized in elder care), concluded that “[q]uite honestly, using my own good judgment sitting 
here” the testator 
was quite clear in that, that she had housed [daughter] and her family for a lot of years 
and it seemed to me as though she was saying that that is what she had [already] given 
her of her estate. . . .  Whether that is right or not, it sure tells me that she thought through 
this issue and made a decision on that. . . .  We’re not here to double guess . . . by using 
our value standards. 
Id. at 777–82.  Affirming the trial court’s admission of the will to probate, the appellate court found 
that although “others might have placed a different assessment on the relative claims of the daugh-
ters and the sons,” the decision ultimately belonged to the testator.  Id. at 781–82. 
 191. See Sloan v. Segal, No. 2319-VCS, 2009 WL 1204494, at *7, *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 
2009) (discussing earlier version of will explaining “I give no part of my estate to either of my sons, 
Frank Sloan and Jack K. Sloan, or to their Issue.  This is because of the fact that they have voluntari-
ly removed themselves from my life and have made no effort to contact me in any way, since 1991, 
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Although none of the cases in the sample discussed wills with ex-
plicit purpose provisions or statements of the testator’s philosophy, sev-
eral cases did refer to wills with language that was ostensibly unneces-
sary but descriptive.  This form of expressive language also proved help-
ful, or at least not problematic, in the few cases in which it appeared.  For 
example, phrases of identification defining the beneficiary or her rela-
tionship with the testator, such as “lifelong” or “faithful” friend, helped 
courts to find and uphold donative intent with respect to the beneficiary 
to whom the description applied.192  One case also upheld a will that de-
                                                                                                                                     
leaving only my son, Louis Segal, to care for me and to correct my financial problems caused by 
other people,” which, the court found, helped provide “ample evidence that [testator’s] testamentary 
intent for over a decade was to leave nothing to Frank or Jack, either from her estate or through the 
Power of Appointment,” leaving “no doubt that [testator] would have willingly signed—nay, de-
manded to sign” the disputed codicil needed to correct a technical oversight); In re Succession of 
Hollis, 987 So. 2d 387, 392 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding no undue influence where holographic will 
contained provision equalizing share for son who received stock in family business).  But see Pirtle 
v. Tucker, 960 So. 2d 620, 624 (Ala. 2006) (reversing summary judgment because testator’s grand-
daughters raised sufficient questions of fact regarding neighbor’s influence to go to jury on undue 
influence claim, notwithstanding a forfeiture clause and a statement in the will declaring that it was 
“not made as the result of a contract of understanding with any other person but solely of my own 
free will”).  The more difficult issue arises when the descriptive language is suspect, for example 
erroneous or inaccurate.  See Chapman v. Varela, 213 P.3d 1109 (N.M. 2009); see also Rothwell v. 
Singleton, 257 S.W.3d 121, 123 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (holograph, the most recent of at least nineteen 
wills, explained that daughter was ninety-year-old testator’s “only help over many years” but miss-
pelled daughter’s name).  In Chapman, for example, the testator, a mother of nine, executed a will 
that contained a detailed, spiteful, and apparently inaccurate explanation of why she left a single 
dollar to eight of her children.  213 P.3d at 1109.  The remaining child, who received the balance of 
testator’s estate, had cared for testator prior to her death, including bathing testator, buying her gro-
ceries, cleaning her house, taking her to the doctor, paying her bills, and helping her to communicate 
with others.  Id. at 1118–19.  The challenged will contained explanatory language that “purported to 
detail [Testator’s] grievances with several” of the disinherited offspring.  Id. at 1113.  The trial court 
invalidated the will on the basis of undue influence by the favored child, and ultimately the New 
Mexico Supreme Court agreed, finding sufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings of 
a confidential relationship between the testator and her favored daughter and “suspicious circums-
tances” surrounding the will’s execution.  Id. at 1126.  Notably absent from the decision was any 
discussion of how the will’s language demonstrated the testator’s strong feelings about the children 
she decided not to benefit; on the other hand, though, testimony from various witnesses called into 
question the truth and accuracy of the statements about those beneficiaries that appeared in the will.  
Id. at 1121–22 (“[I]t would be arbitrary to refuse to consider evidence that a will is full of false or 
unrepresentative assertions about the people it disinherits.”). 
 192. See, e.g., Kersey v. Williamson, 670 S.E.2d 405, 406 (Ga. 2008) (rejecting claim of undue 
influence where testator’s will devised entire estate to his “life-long friend,” whom he had known for 
thirty years, to the exclusion of collateral relatives); In re Will of Carter, 948 So. 2d 455, 456 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2007) (rejecting claim of undue influence brought by disinherited son, where father’s will 
left everything to predeceased spouse and then friend “who has faithfully served my wife and me 
during extended illnesses for many years”); cf. In re Estate of Wiltfong, 148 P.3d 465, 466 (Colo. 
App. 2006) (reversing and remanding trial court’s determination that typewritten and signed letter 
not a will where letter explained that if anything ever happened to decedent, everything he owned 
should go to his long-time domestic partner, because the partner, their pets, and an aunt were his 
only family, and “everyone else is dead to me”; although not holographic, because material portions 
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scribed a visual impairment from which the testator was suffering when 
she executed the document.193  Finally, colloquial language, language or 
phrasing in the testator’s individual voice, helped evidence the testator’s 
purpose.194  In contrast, courts were more likely to find undue influence 
when the testator’s language appeared to come from a source other than 
the testator.195 
In each of these examples, the testator used language that could be 
characterized as expressive because it was not required to achieve the 
will’s nonlinguistic purposes.  Rather than finding this deviation proble-
matic, courts greeted the respective testators’ more deliberate and pur-
poseful approach to language with respect.196 
                                                                                                                                     
were not handwritten, potentially an attested will that failed to comply with formalities but was 
cured through harmless error doctrine). 
 193. See In re Succession of Culotta, 900 So. 2d 137, 138 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 194. See In re Estate of Clementi, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2008) (finding testator to 
have charitable intent when will provided “I give the balance of my assets to a charitable foundation 
or trust in my name to be run by [executor/scrivener]”); In re Succession of Hollis, 987 So. 2d 387, 
395 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding testator’s deliberate intent to treat all her children equally when 
such language was specifically preserved in her will); Conrad v. Gamble, 962 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (finding undue influence in will leaving property to “my loyal cousin . . . in 
consideration of LOVE AND AFFECTION” where prior will left property to testator’s “godson” 
and “goddaughter,” which, according to drafting attorney, “reflected the decedent’s choice of 
words”); see also Langford v. McCormick, 552 So. 2d 964, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding 
testator to have taken command of the estate planning process and thereby be less susceptible to 
undue influence where testator specifically requested scrivener to include additional more expansive 
powers for executor). 
 195. See, e.g., Chapman, 213 P.3d at 1123 (“[T]he finder of fact reasonably could have in-
ferred that Viola both wrote the language that ended up in the will and also shepherded it through 
multiple drafts and meetings with a notary and an attorney until the will had been properly legally 
executed in nearly the exact form in which Viola had first drafted it.”); infra text accompanying 
notes 194–203 (discussing Estate of Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Ct. App. 2006), in which the court 
observed that testator, whose will was invalidated for undue influence, appeared to know and be able 
to use language of capacity, but such use did not show that testator understood the language); cf. 
Smith, supra note 9, at 74 (“There is value in having clients put their thoughts, priorities, and con-
victions into their own words, because such statements are more credible to family members who 
know the individual.  The attorney’s legally exact but impersonal choice of words will sound like 
someone put words in the decedent’s mouth—because that is exactly what happened.”); Sneddon, 
supra note 29, at 65 (“[I]njection of a false voice does not further the testator’s interests.”). 
 196. In sharp contrast are cases where language in the will appears to be so unimportant, for-
mulaic, and ready-to-wear that the testator did not even bother to meet with the attorney before hav-
ing the will prepared for execution.  See, e.g., Lavigne v. Loulakis, No. TTDCV074007053S, 2009 
WL 660211, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2009) (attorney drafted will after only a thirty-minute 
discussion with testator (who gave wrong answers) and completion of “will intake sheet” completed 
by niece being accused of undue influence); In re Estate of Rosato, No. 0604-1431, 2007 WL 
3775923, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl., Orph. Div. June 25, 2007) (scrivener never met or talked to dece-
dent); Carvalho v. Carvalho, 978 A.2d 455, 458 (Vt. 2009) (where ninety-two-year-old widow 
“talked with a paralegal in the attorney’s office and requested that the office prepare for her a will, 
an advanced healthcare directive, and a financial power of attorney” and “attorney understood that 
[testator] would on that day ‘sign her . . . will,’” a misunderstanding ensued because testator signed 
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C. Acknowledging the Limits of Expressive Language 
Wills language is undoubtedly only one piece of a larger undue in-
fluence inquiry, which also looks to confidential relationships, condition 
of the testator, and other suspicious circumstances.197  And while it is 
simple to propose that using more expressive and explanatory language 
has the potential to help readers and writers of wills, this suggestion ad-
mittedly has limited utility when a testator’s competence and free will 
are such that the testator is unable to formulate intent. 
Indeed, many cases involve factual situations where a discussion of 
language at any one point in time, whether it be from an interpretative or 
a drafting perspective, would be meaningless in light of the testators’ 
progressively degenerative condition.  Consider, for example, Estate of 
Odian, a case from the survey in which a California appellate court inva-
lidated a will that left all of the testator’s property to her paid live-in ca-
regiver.198  The testator and her sister, neither of whom married or had 
children, were able to amass significant wealth over their respective life-
times by investing their modest incomes with the help of a long-time fi-
nancial advisor.199  Both sisters, while in their early eighties, executed 
wills leaving their respective estates to each other and then to seven char-
ities.200  After the first sister’s death, however, Helen, the surviving sis-
ter, began a decline that ended in her death in 2003 at age eighty-seven.  
During this six-year period, Helen continued to rely on her financial ad-
visor but also hired the caregiver to assist with housework, driving, and 
other daily tasks.  Not surprisingly, Helen appreciated the help that the 
caregiver provided and wanted to express gratitude because, as Helen 
indicated, “she [otherwise] would not have lived as long.”201  Over time, 
though, Helen’s memory began to fail and her understanding of finances 
to wane; she became increasingly suspicious of those around her, includ-
ing her lifelong friends.202  She nevertheless did what a conscientious 
estate planning lawyer might advise her to do: she stayed connected with 
her testamentary plan and continued to revise it periodically.203  Even 
with repeated inquiries by estate planning professionals, medical person-
nel, and a trained investigator whose job it was to determine whether a 
                                                                                                                                     
disclaimer of interest in son’s estate, which may have been a smart tax-planning move but was not 
consistent with her intent). 
 197. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.3 & cmts. e–h. 
 198. Estate of Odian, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402–03 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 199. Id. at 392. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 393. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 394–95. 
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person had mental capability to make decisions for herself, Helen’s tes-
tamentary intent was difficult to discern while she was alive.204  She ap-
peared to know the language of capacity, but even those around Helen 
when she was living were not sure where her knowledge originated and 
whether the intent she demonstrated was her own.205 
Ultimately, the Odian court relied on a California statute designed 
to protect elderly dependents from making transfers that might be the 
“product of fraud, menace, duress, or undue influence.”206  The statute 
shifted the burden to the presumptively disqualified transferee to provide 
“substantial evidence” that the will was not the product of undue influ-
ence, a burden the caregiver was not able to satisfy.207  The end result in 
the Odian case was to invalidate any estate planning documents executed 
by Helen after 1997.208  Language of any type in Helen’s will would not 
have been able to help Helen, her caregiver, her natural heirs, or the court 
because Helen was unable to formulate intent while alive.209  Even ac-
cepting that the ultimate goal of those charged with carrying out the 
will’s directives is effectuating the testator’s intent, the testator’s inabili-
ty to formulate and convey her intent, as in Odian, make it difficult to 
explain how any language, expressive or otherwise, might facilitate the 
process. 
Nevertheless, where a testator is able to formulate intent,210 the un-
due influence cases from the five-year period are noteworthy in that they 
respond to estate planning lawyers’ (and will scholars’) traditional reluc-
tance to use or recommend using expressive language in a will for fear 
that such language will obscure and confuse the testator’s intent rather 
than illuminate it. 
                                                            
 204. See id. at 394–97 (“Helen suffered from mild to moderate expressive aphasia—a difficulty 
in retrieving words—as well as difficulty in organizing information.  She also had attention and 
concentration problems, and both long-term and short-term memory problems. . . .  He also con-
cluded that she was very dependent and that as a result of that, along with her cognitive impairments, 
she was vulnerable to undue influence.”). 
 205. See, e.g., id. at 396 (examining physician startled to hear Helen’s formal statement that 
trust “was made in accordance with my wishes”). 
 206. Id. at 397–402. 
 207. Id. at 401–02. 
 208. Id. at 392 (affirming lower court judgment). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Estate of Lightfield, 213 P.3d 468, 473–74 (Mont. 2009) (documenting 
testator’s decline, including increasing incidents of paranoid delusions, and invalidating wills pro-
pounded by each of testator’s children, including one will that explained basis for unequal division); 
In re Estate of Hedke, 775 N.W.2d 13, 33 (Neb. 2009) (upholding determination that son unduly 
influenced testamentary documents of mother who suffered from dementia because, although will 
was silent on reasons for disposition, testimony evidenced mother’s continued but mistaken belief 
that her plan benefited her two children equally). 
 210. Even where a will’s author has testamentary capacity, changes to property or family may 
occur after a will is drafted and before death that render the will’s language meaningless or ambi-
guous.  See Garvey, supra note 29, at 47–48; Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 60, at 611. 
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D. Using the Language in Wills Rather than Side Letters  
A final but surprising observation deriving from these cases is the 
comparative ineffectiveness of expressive or explanatory language that 
appears in a separate writing composed by the testator, often called a 
“side letter” or “letter of wishes.”211  As many of the cases from this five-
year period show, where a will’s language does not illustrate the dece-
dent’s unfettered donative intent, courts often consider evidence of intent 
from other sources.  The primary source for this evidence is testimony 
from physicians, friends, neighbors, relatives, and even the attor-
ney/scrivener,212 but courts also consider evidence in the form of video-
tapes213 of and nonbinding written statements by the testator.214  Al-
though videotapes and other electronic recording mechanisms have been 
recognized as useful devices to evidence the testator’s capacity and pur-
                                                            
 211. See Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843, 846–47 (R.I. 2005). 
 212. See, e.g., Bell v. Hutchins, 268 S.W.3d 358, 362 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing trial 
court’s finding that housekeeper had to disprove presumption of undue influence and remanding for 
new trial where will did not include explanatory language but estate planning attorney testified that 
testator “explained to her the reasoning behind dividing his estate between his daughter and [his 
housekeeper]”); Hernon v. Hernon, 908 N.E.2d 777, 782 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (crediting witness 
testimony that “blood relations meant a great deal to the testator and . . . about the fact that his ne-
phews (who were disinherited) were the sole males to carry on the Hernon name”); Estate of Rutland 
v. Rutland, 24 So. 3d 347 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (doctor testimony); Estate of McCorkle v. Beeson, 
27 So. 3d 1180 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“uncontradicted” witness testimony); Williams v. Estate of 
Cheeks, 961 So. 2d 65, 69 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (attorney’s testimony that testator, who gave twen-
ty-seven nieces and nephews each 1% and balance to caretaking niece of 73%, wanted to be “fly on 
the wall” when final niece received only $1); Lazelle v. Estate of Crabtree, 225 P.3d 11 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2009) (testimony from attorney and friends); Howard v. Nasser, 613 S.E.2d 64, 66 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2005) (witness testimony that decedent left property to spouse over nephew because mounting 
tension had led decedent to exclaim that he would rather “throw that money in the garbage can” than 
allow nephew to receive “one cent of my money”); In re Estate of Smart, No. 2007AP2501, 769 
N.W.2d 572, 2009 WL 1151987, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished) (attorney testified that he 
asked testator whether she was being influenced, to which she responded “[n]obody did and nobody 
could”). 
 213. See, e.g., King v. Brown, 632 S.E.2d 638, 639 (Ga. 2006) (jury found will invalid based 
on viewing videotape of execution ceremony); In re Estate of Chapman, 966 So. 2d 1262, 1265 
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (“resounding[]” affirmation of will by testator on audiotape of execution 
ceremony); Slusarenko v. Slusarenko, 147 P.3d 920, 923 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (videotape showed 
testator expressing multiple grievances with his children); In re Estate of Pringle, 751 N.W.2d 277, 
285 (S.D. 2008) (transcripts of telephone conversations); Birmingham-Queen v. Whitmire, No. 04-
05-00646-CV, 2006 WL 1539587, at *6 (Tex. App. June 7, 2006) (testator explained in taped execu-
tion ceremony that will gave property to second wife to the exclusion of children because surviving 
widow was a “good wife” upon whom he was completely dependent).  But see In re Estate of 
Laughter, 23 So. 3d 1055 (Miss. 2009) (videotapes excluded from evidence). 
 214. See, e.g., Bailey v. Sawyer, 991 So. 2d 725, 732 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (written instruc-
tions to attorney on how testator wanted property divided); In re Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d 672, 678 
(D.C. 2008) (handwritten notes); Barber v. Holmes, 653 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. 2007) (affidavit alleging 
undue influence years after will executed not admissible); In re Estate of Russell, 311 S.W.3d 528, 
533 (Tex. App. 2009) (finding testator did not intend to disinherit granddaughters based in part on 
Post-It notes attached to will). 
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poseful decision making about her will,215 they raise nearly as many con-
cerns as they satisfy.216  Supplemental writings, such as side letters, are a 
tempting alternative mechanism by which the testator may express her 
individual desires and provide guidance to her fiduciaries and beneficia-
ries, thereby reaping the nonlegal benefits of expressive writing without 
obscuring the dispositive document.217  Notably, though, because the let-
ters are designed to be nonbinding, fiduciaries and beneficiaries may ig-
nore them, and the letters may never become part of the court record 
should the will be contested. 
The difference between including expressive language in a side let-
ter and including it in the will itself is illustrated in Bajakian v. Eri-
nakes.218  The Bajakian case involved a dispute between two siblings 
over the will of their widowed mother, Blanch Erinakes.  Blanch ex-
ecuted the contested will in November of 1994 and left $25,000 to her 
daughter, Mildred, and the balance of her “rather large” estate to her son, 
Stephan.219  Blanch’s prior will, executed five years earlier, divided her 
assets equally between her two children.220  Mildred challenged her 
mother’s 1994 will for lack of capacity and undue influence.  Although 
no mention of the language from Blanch’s will appears in the appellate 
decision, the text of a letter purportedly written by her in May 1994 ap-
pears in full.221  The letter recounts that when Blanch’s husband died 
twenty years earlier, she “was left with the responsibility of carrying on 
his life’s work, which was the movie theatres and real estate business.”222  
                                                            
 215. ROGER W. ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS & ESTATES 
136–37 (3d ed. 2007); DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 205; Langbein, Compliance, 
supra note 13, at 519; see also Grant, supra note 77, at 105–10. 
 216. Videotapes may expose a will to challenge that would not otherwise exist by, for example, 
revealing frailties that would not be apparent from the writing standing alone.  Accordingly, an es-
tate planning lawyer must deliberate seriously before deciding to tape a will-execution ceremony and 
must ensure that safeguards exist to prevent the tape from undermining rather than demonstrating 
intent and capacity.  See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 205. 
 217. Id. (The source suggests the strategy of a lawyer requesting that the client “write, in the 
client’s handwriting, a letter to the lawyer setting forth in detail the disposition the client wishes to 
make.  Upon receiving the letter, the lawyer replies, detailing the consequences of the disposition for 
the client’s family, and asks for a letter setting forth the reasons for the disposition.  After receiving 
this letter, the will is drafted as the client wants.  The letters are kept in the lawyer’s files.”); Alexan-
der A. Bove, Jr., The Letter of Wishes: Can We Influence Discretion in Discretionary Trusts?, 35 
ACTEC J. 38 (2009); see also Beyer, Blue Screen, supra note 56, at 88 (“If the testator wishes to 
express nonmandatory desires, then the attorney should use a separate non-testamentary docu-
ment.”).  These letters are used frequently in the context of asset protection trusts, where the settlor 
seeks to relinquish control of the assets but wants to provide guidance to the trustees on issues rang-
ing from investment to distributions. 
 218. Bajakian v. Erinakes, 880 A.2d 843 (R.I. 2005). 
 219. Id. at 846. 
 220. Id. at 845. 
 221. Id. at 847. 
 222. Id. 
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As Blanch dealt with the “nightmare” of loss and tried to “keep every-
thing going,” the “only full time support” she received came from her 
son Stephan.223  They “worked together” to “retain the properties, pay off 
seven mortgages and buil[d] a few new stores.”224  For that reason, and 
because she desired to keep the businesses operating rather than allowing 
them to be sold, Blanch explained “it only makes sense to me to let [Ste-
phan] continue to carry on in this capacity, in control and to have owner-
ship of everything,” expressing her belief “in my heart that when the day 
comes when [Stephan] is able to show a profit he can share it as he sees 
fit.”225 
During trial, Stephan sought to have this letter admitted into evi-
dence, but the court denied the motion because it found that the declara-
tions of memory contained in the letter were inadmissible hearsay.226  
Following a four-day trial, Stephan moved for judgment as a matter of 
law, the trial court reserved decision on the motion and sent the case to 
the jury, and the jury found that Blanch Erinakes lacked testamentary 
capacity and therefore invalidated her 1994 will.227  Stephan then moved 
for a new trial, and the court denied his motion.  On appeal, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court found that the trial judge had not abused his dis-
cretion in declining to admit the written statement,228 and it affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law229 and 
motion for a new trial.230  With respect to the evidentiary ruling regard-
ing the side letter, the appellate court upheld the trial judge’s determina-
tion that Blanch’s statements of memory were hearsay.231 
Not only did the explanation in Blanch Erinakes’s letter explain the 
basis for her otherwise curious decision to treat her daughter and son dif-
ferently, but it also brought her story into the courtroom, giving her the 
opportunity to express her intent to her beneficiaries and, if they were not 
listening, to the jury.  Blanch would have communicated her message 
                                                            
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 846.  It also found that “‘[u]nfortunately, this statement cannot be redacted . . . or 
edited in some form to take out the declarations of memory from [the] statements of intention.’”  Id. 
at 848. 
 227. Id. at 846.  Because it found lack of capacity, the jury did not render a decision on Mil-
dred’s undue influence claim. 
 228. Id. at 848–49. 
 229. Id. at 850. 
 230. Id. at 852–53. 
 231. The appellate court noted that Stephan had not sought a cautionary instruction or sug-
gested a creative way to redact his mother’s letter, which was his burden as the party seeking admis-
sion of the evidence.  Id. at 848 & nn.7–8.  The appellate court also recognized in dicta the trial 
judge’s “skepticism as to the bonafide nature of the May 5, 1994 statement” but refused to opine on 
these views.  Id. at 849 n.10. 
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more effectively had she incorporated her explanation into the testamen-
tary instrument itself.  The Bajakian decision thus illustrates the risks 
associated with relying on side letters to supplement a will and make it 
more expressive.  Although the decision implies that pure statements of 
intent in a side letter might have been admissible,232 and although a court 
ultimately might choose to ignore precatory language that appears in a 
will itself,233 the case suggests that side letters are not without their con-
cerns.  Relying on nonbinding letters to contain important explanations 
or expressions, as practicing lawyers often do, might lead to those ex-
pressions being ignored or devalued by the legal readers.234 
In sum, the cases from the five-year survey that discuss wills with 
expressive language support the idea that descriptive, explanatory lan-
guage, even simple deviations from formula, can help evidence the testa-
tor’s ability to formulate intent and communicate that intent to her au-
diences.  Instead of the anticipated host of wills setting the reasoning or 
story behind the unnatural or unequal dispositions, however, the survey 
of cases revealed a dearth of expressive language.  This result suggests 
either that wills with expressive language have not been contested on 
undue influence grounds—the most common basis for challenge—as 
frequently as wills that contain only formulaic language, or that notwith-
standing the many benefits of expressive language, a reluctance to draft 
wills containing expressive language persists.235 
V.  CONCLUSION: THE SOCIETAL VALUE OF CONSIDERING WILL 
WRITING GENERALLY AND EXPRESSIVE LANGUAGE IN PARTICULAR 
Few would argue that laws about death do not influence the public 
good and raise issues of justice and morality when, for example, the laws 
involve topics like capital punishment or an individual’s right to die.236  
In comparison, wills law and, in particular, how wills are written seem 
somehow smaller, perhaps less worthy of attention, but this initial reac-
tion is mistaken for three interrelated reasons.  First, analyzing wills law 
and its intensely personal dispositions allows scholars to look (micro-
scopically) at individual human stories and (macroscopically) at human 
                                                            
 232. Id. at 848 & nn.7–8. 
 233. See Schiavo, supra note 64. 
 234. See also Barber v. Holmes, 653 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Ga. 2007) (affirming trial court’s deter-
mination that affidavit containing statements by testator that she was unhappy with will were inad-
missible hearsay made by testatrix years after signing her will); Conrad v. Gamble, 962 A.2d 1007, 
1021–22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (affirming trial court’s refusal on hearsay grounds to allow 
testimony “as to why [the decedent] may have wanted to change her will”). 
 235. Of course, another possible explanation is that expressive language is not relevant to the 
issue of undue influence.  But see supra text accompanying notes 177–79. 
 236. See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 89, at 975, 1001–03 (describing euthanasia debate). 
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interaction, interpretation, and expression.237  As authors of a leading 
casebook explain, wills law is a “tapestry of humanity” where “every 
behind-the-scenes peek, every quirk of the parties’ behavior has its place 
as a piece of ornament fitting into the larger whole.”238 
Second, in a society whose members are generally characterized by 
a reluctance to face mortality,239 many people die without wills.240  By 
encouraging testators to add greater expression—be it descriptive detail, 
explanation, narrative, or statements of individual philosophy to their 
wills—we allow those testators to define themselves, to think mindfully 
about death, and to take control of their personal legacies.  In fact, foster-
ing opportunity for individuals to express themselves in their will may 
make the estate planning process more appealing to people who believe 
                                                            
 237. See, e.g., Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, supra note 8, at 1060 (using the law of 
wills and inheritance as “a case-study of the jurisprudential phenomenon of structural inconsistency 
in law”); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the Problem of Doctrinal 
Change, 79 OR. L. REV. 527, 531–32 (2000) (using the law of trusts and estates, admittedly “a single 
patch of the legal landscape,” because it provides “a perfect laboratory for the study of legal dynam-
ics, revealing evolutionary patterns that are bound to reappear within other, far-flung areas of doc-
trine”); Robertson, supra note 30, at 1045–46 (“When we seek the meaning of a donative document, 
we are not searching just for an ordinary fact, some object that is or some event that has occurred.  
We are seeking the meaning of law, albeit privately made law.”). 
 238. DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at xxxii. 
 239. See SOGYAL RINPOCHE, THE TIBETAN BOOK OF LIVING AND DYING 7–8 (Patrick Gaffney 
& Andrew Harvey eds., 1994) (“When I first came to the West, I was shocked by the contrast be-
tween the attitudes to death I had been brought up with and those I now found.  For all its technolo-
gical achievements, modern Western society has no real understanding of death . . . [P]eople today 
are taught to deny death, and taught that it means nothing but annihilation and loss. . . .   Others look 
on death with a naive, thoughtless cheerfulness . . . .  Of these two attitudes toward death, one views 
death as something to scurry away from and the other as something that will just take care of it-
self.”); MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE, THE ESSAYS OF MICHEL DE MONTAIGNE 95 (M. A. Screech, trans., 
ed., 1991) (“Men come and they go and they trot and they dance, and never a word about death.  All 
well and good.  Yet when death does come—to them, their wives, their children, their friends—
catching them unawares and unprepared, then what storms of passion overwhelm them, what cries, 
what fury, what despair!”). 
 240. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, supra note 13, at 2-1 to 2-3.  Although more 
individuals die with valid wills in place today than ever before in America, see Sneddon, supra note 
29, at 4–5 & n.7 (citing Carole Shammas, Marylynn Salmon & Michel Dahlin, INHERITANCE IN 
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987)), more than half of Americans die without 
a will.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, supra note 21, at 71 (relying on Gallup poll data); see also 
DiRusso, supra note 21, at 41 (random survey of 374 individuals indicates that only 31% of Ameri-
cans have wills, of which 20% are attorney generated and 11% are holographic).  These numbers, 
however, may be exaggerated.  See WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW, supra note 13, at 
2-2 to 2-3 (The authors analyze age demographics to conclude that “[p]erhaps it is more accurate to 
suggest that most people who die prematurely die intestate”; “if 60.7 percent of the 46–54 popula-
tion, 63.4 percent of the 55–64 population, and 84.6 percent of the 65-and-over population have 
wills, the conventional wisdom that most people die intestate may be unfounded.”). 
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will drafting was not intended for them because they lacked a significant 
financial impetus to execute a will.241 
Third, deliberate choice about how property is distributed, rather 
than robotic adherence to form, is most meaningful to people whose 
goals will not be served by the default laws of intestacy.242  Working to-
ward a system that gives those individuals an opportunity to share their 
last words can give them a crucial voice.243 
Of course, asking a testator to use expressive language in her will 
demands as much of that testator as it potentially offers.  Because writing 
is so important to audience and author alike, and because writers are en-
gaged in the endless task of trying to express their thoughts so that those 
thoughts are perfectly understood, writing (like interpretation) can be an 
excruciating process that might lead to frustration and even desperation.  
Indeed, this very theme is central to the will-interpretation scholarship 
discussed in Part II.244  Yet the difficulty of achieving perfect expression 
need not dictate a reluctance to pursue it.  James Boyd White, who spent 
his life dissecting and analyzing language (and legal language in particu-
lar), acknowledges language’s limits but guides a writer on how to tran-
scend those limits.245  Explaining that any writer is not only the product 
                                                            
 241. See Sneddon, supra note 29, at 41 (“In the era of decreased wealth, the non-financial 
legacy may be even more important to the individual.”); cf. Davis, supra note 88, at 223, 225 (“The 
focus on private law and, stranger still, wills and intestate succession, is an initially implausible, or at 
least an unfamiliar one in examining racial issues in this country. . . .  Yet . . . these case studies open 
a window on a more general economy of race, status, and sex . . . .”). 
 242. See Foster, supra note 21, at 206–07 (“The rules of intestate succession—the default rules 
that apply in the absence of a will—provide rigidly for inheritance by status.  The decedent’s closest 
relatives by blood, adoption, or marriage automatically inherit, irrespective of their actual relation-
ship with the decedent.”); Lela P. Love & Stewart E. Sterk, Leaving More than Money: Mediation 
Clauses in Estate Planning Documents, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539, 551–52 (2008) (“Testators 
who write wills . . . generally have a strong view about how their assets should be distributed.  Often, 
they have rejected the off-the-rack distribution furnished by intestate succession statutes in favor of a 
distribution that departs from social norms” and they “want[] to assure that [their] wishes are res-
pected.”); cf.  Hacker, supra note 147, at 16–17 (reviewing twenty-three empirical studies on inherit-
ance from around the world and concluding that women write wills as frequently as men). 
 243. See, e.g., Champine, supra note 46, at 428–30 (describing how preferences and default 
rules jeopardize the testamentary plans of atypical testators, such as unmarried or same-sex couples); 
Davis, supra note 88, at 236 (describing how testamentary freedom allowed one property holder to 
alter the norms of race, sex, and property imposed in the antebellum South); Fajer, supra note 68, at 
578; Spitko, supra note 11, at 1077–80. 
 244. See supra text accompanying notes 24–26. 
 245. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 276–77 (1984) (“We are in 
part the products of our language, but each time we speak we remake it. . . .  One is perpetually 
telling one’s story to oneself and others, trying to shape things so that the next step fits with what has 
gone before, ceaselessly claiming significance for one’s experience and actions, and the question 
always is, in what language can (or must) one do these things?  What are the implications—the 
adequacies and inadequacies—of our common ways of describing the world, of constituting rela-
tions, of feeling injury, of acting socially, and of aspiring to what is not yet?  The language marks the 
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of the language she acquires but also the sculptor of such language, 
White recognizes that we are “perpetually” asking “[w]hat are the impli-
cations—the adequacies and inadequacies—of our common ways of de-
scribing the world, of constituting relations, of feeling injury, of acting 
socially, and of aspiring to what is not yet?”246  Rather than despairing 
that “we live in an incoherent and elemental flux in which no reasoning, 
no meaning, is possible,” writers must recognize that “in our actual lives 
we show that we know how to read and speak, to live with language, 
texts, and each other, and to do so with considerable confidence.”247  
Language should not be abandoned as inadequate, or reduced to formula, 
but rather “[w]hen we discover that we have in this world no earth or 
rock to stand or walk upon but only shifting sea and sky and wind, the 
mature response is not to lament the loss of fixity but to learn to sail.”248 
Being deliberate about the writing process contributes substantially 
to the product ultimately generated and therefore to the growing body of 
substantive law.  This recognition applies to wills just as it does to any 
form of writing, legal or otherwise.  In fact, in no other field more than in 
the study and practice of wills, where life and death are constant con-
cerns, is one reminded more of circles: we cannot read and interpret 
without having something to read, and we cannot write without the 
knowledge that it will be read.  This depiction of a spiraling process of 
reviewing and rethinking evokes a 1933 essay by Virginia Woolf entitled 
“Twelfth Night at the Old Vic.”249  Reviewing a production of Shakes-
peare’s pastoral comedy, Woolf considers the division among Shakes-
peareans into “those who prefer to read Shakespeare in the book; those 
who prefer to see him acted on the stage; and those who run perpetually 
from book to stage gathering plunder.”250  Woolf recognizes how Sha-
kespeare writes “not with the whole of his mind mobilized and under 
control but with feelers left flying that sport and play with words,” so 
that “the play seems as we read it to tremble perpetually on the brink of 
music.”251  After tantalizing her reader with the “lights and body of the 
mind’s stage,” Woolf wonders why we should “imprison” the evocative 
words within the “bodies of real men and women.”  She describes the 
trepidation she feels in entering the theatre and anticipating “the ruins of 
                                                                                                                                     
mind, and one will normally see that one’s language is contingent, not necessary, only if one expe-
riences a basic cultural dislocation: the sense that words have lost their meaning.”). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 278. 
 248. Id. 
 249. VIRGINIA WOOLF, Twelfth Night at the Old Vic, in THE DEATH OF THE MOTH AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 45 (Harvest/HBJ 1970). 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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the play, at the travesty of the play” but then responds to her own query 
by describing how the play is acted by deft and experienced performers 
whose “bodies together, take our play and remodel it between them” to 
give “the word . . . a body as well as a soul.”252  But no sooner does 
Woolf describe how the actors “make the moment . . . one of intense and 
moving beauty,”253 than she recognizes the limits of their perfor-
mances.254  Ultimately, she concludes “back we must go” to the written 
word so that the comparison feeds our understanding and appreciation. 
This recursive dance between reading and viewing that Woolf de-
scribes is an apt metaphor for the relationship between writing and read-
ing wills and for the value of expressive language generally.  The author, 
in other words the testator or drafter, attempts the difficult goal of creat-
ing and communicating thoughts that her reader will understand.  Each 
opportunity to revisit and rethink language, to re-view it, contributes to 
the ideas and intent behind the words.  Woolf was not expecting (nor 
even wishing) that Shakespeare could rewrite his play; rather, she was 
commenting on the relationship between creation—the writing—and in-
terpretation—the reading or viewing.  By seeing the work in a new way, 
the audience understands the work in a new way.  Similarly, the writing 
of those who are able to consider their ideas—both in how they are for-
mulated and how they are expressed—ultimately benefits.  The lesson of 
Woolf’s essay is a lesson in expressiveness.  The better an author is at 
recognizing the limits of her language, the more she can strive to exceed 
those limits, formulating her own ideas and communicating them to her 
community.  Why should we who practice and study the law of wills in-
sist on insulating “last words,” with all of their possibility, from this 
process? 
By questioning the assumptions that competent drafters can easily 
anticipate and effectuate the testator’s wishes, and then by examining 
whether the use of any particular language in will drafting is potentially 
more successful in achieving the decedent’s important goals, whatever 
they might be, wills scholars will further the vital but elusive goal of ef-
fectuating the testator’s intent and, in so doing, help her establish her 
personal legacy and create an expression of her individual self and a tes-
tament to those she leaves behind. 
                                                            
 252. Id. at 47. 
 253. Id. at 48. 
 254. She explains that in the performance a continuity of perception is lacking whereas the 
“mind in reading spins a web from scene to scene, compounds a background from apples falling, and 
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